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It Takes a Village: Municipal Condemnation
Proceedings and Public/Private Partnerships
for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value
Preservation, and Local Economic Recovery
Robert Hockett*
Respected real estate analysts forecast that the U.S. is now poised to experience a renewed round of home mortgage foreclosures over the coming six years. Up to eleven million
underwater mortgages will be affected. Neither our families, our neighborhoods, nor our state
and national economies can bear a resumption of crisis on this order of magnitude.
I argue that ongoing and self-worsening slump in the primary and secondary mortgage markets is rooted in a host of recursive collective action challenges structurally akin to
those that brought on the real estate bubble and bust in the first place. Collective action problems of this sort require duly authorized collective agents for their solution. At present, the
optimally situated such agents for purposes of mortgage market clearing are municipal governments exercising their traditional eminent domain authority. What is required, in short, is
a manner of “inverse Kelo” action, pursuant to which eminent domain authority is exercised
in order to keep people in their homes rather than to eject them.
I sketch a plan pursuant to which municipalities, in partnership with investors, can
condemn underwater mortgage notes, pay mortgagees fair market value for the same, and systematically write down principal for mortgagors. Because in so doing they will be doing what
parties themselves would do voluntarily were they not challenged by structural impediments
*
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to collective action, municipalities acting on this plan will be rendering all parties better off.
They will also be leading the urgently needed project of eliminating debt overhang nationwide
and thereby at last ending our ongoing debt deflation.
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Introduction: A Missing Collective Agent
Six years after residential real estate prices peaked and then plunged, U.S.
primary and secondary mortgage markets continue to languish in a self-worsening
slump.1 As the modifying phrase “self-worsening” suggests, feedback effects constitute a critical component both of the problem and of its stubborn persistence.2 These
effects operate both as between property prices and mortgage default rates, and as
between primary and secondary mortgage markets and broader local and regional
economies.3 Collective action hurdles can prevent forward or hasten backward
movement by endowing individual expectations with significant “self-fulfilling
prophecy” properties.4 These are the source of the aforementioned “feedback” effects—effects that can amplify optimism into dysfunctional bubble or boom, and pessimism into bust and protracted depression.5
As it happens, the mentioned feedback loops are themselves critically mediated through uncoordinated market decisions taken by multiple actors who face
formidable. Because the hallmark of such “recursive collective action problems,” as
we shall here call them, is their aggregation of multiple individually rational decisions into collectively self-defeating and even self-worsening outcomes,6 their solution requires the presence of a collective agent empowered to act on behalf of all parties to optimize joint outcomes.7

Telling statistics are supplied in abundance below, infra Part II.
The structural dynamics are laid out below, infra Parts I and II.
3 Id. Mortgage markets causally interact with the broader economy with particular
force because homes are the principal form that wealth takes among the broad American middle class that healthy consumer expenditure both economic growth and employment depends
on. See Robert Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting: Sifting Through the Mortgage Mess, 9
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting]; see
also infra Parts I and II.
4 Classic cases in point are bank runs (before deposit insurance), hyperinflations, and
liquidity traps. See infra Parts I and II. See also Robert Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, 5 J. APP. ECON. (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems].
5 The one typically follows the other, with assets symmetrically undervalued by uncoordinated markets during busts just as they have been previously overvalued by uncoordinated markets during antecedent booms. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems supra
note 4; see also Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. R. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance].
6 See infra Part II. The term “recursive collective action problem” is introduced in
Robert Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0: An Essay in Constructive Retrieval, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0]. See also Hockett, Recursive
Collective Action Problems, supra note 4. These problems’ defining feature is their “spiraling”
tendency – upward (as in inflations) or downward (as in bank runs and slumps) – as rooted in
uncoordinated, “self-fulfillingly prophetic” individual decisions. See infra Part II.
7 See sources cited supra notes 4-6. This will also be an apt place to note that we shall
often lump “coordination” and “collective action” challenges together, notwithstanding their
1
2
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Against this structural backdrop, some acute observers have come to recognize that some such “collective agent” will be required to solve that collective action
challenge which lies at the heart of that self-worsening slump which continues to afflict U.S. local and regional mortgage markets—and, through them, our local, regional, and hence national economies.8 The question is, what person or entity is best situated to discharge this critical function?
For a number of reasons comprehensively elaborated below,9 many, though
not all of them, rooted in the inherently state-centered character of contract, commercial, trust and real property law under our constitutional order,10 the federal government and its instrumentalities are not now well suited to this task.11 At best they
are but complementarily situated.
States and their instrumentalities—municipalities in particular—are by contrast very well situated to play the appointed role.12 That in turn raises the question
by what means, and under what legal and constitutional authority, states and their
municipalities might best discharge this critical function.
This article addresses and answers that question. The answer it reaches is
that traditional state eminent domain authority, as typically delegated in turn by the
subtle distinctions. We do so partly for reasons of simplification that does no harm in the present context, and partly because collective agents address both kinds of challenge.
8 See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BD., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND
POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS
(white
paper,
Jan.
4,
2012)
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/housing-white-paper20120104.pdf; see also William C. Dudley, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Housing and
the Economic Recovery, Remarks at the N.J.Jersey Bankers Ass’n Econ. Forum (Jan. 6, 2012),
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2012/dud120106.html.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Part IV for more on our state-centered federal system and the reservation
of contract, commercial, and especially trust and real property law to the states pursuant thereto.
11 In addition to Part IV, Part II, in which the failures of the FHFA, the GSEs, HAMP
and HARP are explained, is germane to this point. I hasten to note here that Howell Jackson
proposed a resolution to the crisis using TARP money and eminent domain authority as early
as 2008. See Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2008,
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/0925/p09s02-coop.html.
The author of this article proposed something similar, in this case employing TARP moneys to
fund FHA purchases of voluntarily relinquished troubled mortgages, which he suggested
would be forthcoming in abundance owing to distressed market conditions. FHA would
thereby itself be solving a collective action problem then underwriting (fragmented) market
undervaluation of the mortgages in question. See Robert C. Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36 (2009) [hereinafter Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo] (elaborating
more fully on proposals made by author in several op-eds over the autumn of 2008). For reasons adduced infra, Parts II and IV, I think that at this point the local route is more promising
than the federal, as well as, for reasons adduced infra, Part III, less costly to the public fisc. (The
plan proposed here is investor-funded.) The author continues to think along his own earlier,
as well Professor Jackson’s, lines, however, in finding that federal action would still make for a
welcome complement. See infra Part II.
12 As explained more fully infra Parts III through V.
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states to their municipalities and cognate authorities, is by far the best ground upon
which to act. The article also finds that a combined condemnation and mortgage restructuring plan of a particular form will be by far the best legally and financially
feasible option. We shall call this “the Municipal Plan” (or “the Plan”).
The article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the source and structural dynamics of the ongoing mortgage crisis still facing the nation, its states, and their municipalities.13 Part II then outlines the general form that solutions to crises of this
kind must take—a form that corresponds to the structure of the crisis itself. Part II
also explains why no such solution has yet been forthcoming.14 In essence, it indicates, coordination hurdles of the same form as rendered the crisis possible now render its solution impossible, absent some duly authorized collective agent able to act
on behalf of the interested parties—a role, as just noted, that municipalities are best
situated to play.
Part III then details the Plan mentioned above, indicating both how its structure responds point for point to the structure of the crisis, and how its use of the eminent domain authority capitalizes on municipalities’ optimal positioning for purposes of collectively addressing the coordination challenges that now underwrite
ongoing mortgage inertia.15 It also emphasizes the role of public/private partnering
between municipalities and lenders – including lenders who currently hold mortgage
debt – in the Plan. It emphasizes how this feature enables municipalities to proceed
at no cost to the public fisc – another important advantage, particularly in strapped
times such as these.
Part IV comprehensively lays out the legal and constitutional bases of the
Plan, indicating how the latter carries out precisely that purpose which underlies the
traditional state eminent domain authority.16 Part V then catalogues the immensely
destructive spillover consequences—for borrowers, lenders, neighborhoods, families,
local property values and assessments, local revenue bases, state and local economies, social services, crime rates, and more—of further delay in addressing the crisis.17 Prevention of all of these consequences, this Part indicates, constitutes precisely
that exigent public purpose for which state eminent domain authority exists in our
law.
Although this article constitutes an integrated whole, readers who are interested primarily in the Plan’s financial and economic details and rationale might wish
to focus particularly on Parts I through III. Readers who, by contrast, are interested

13
14
15
16
17

See infra p. 126.
See infra p. 136.
See infra p. 149.
See infra p. 157.
See infra p. 171.
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primarily in the Plan’s constitutional basis and legal-procedural detail should focus
particularly on Parts III through V.
Because the applicable law referenced here is, by its terms, particularly solicitous of the financial, broader economic, and attendant necessities faced by localities
in extremis, however, and is indeed part of our federal system precisely in order to
afford these localities means of efficient address of the same, the financial and economic analysis of the earlier Parts cannot but inform the specifically legal and constitutional analysis of the later Parts.
On that integrative note, the article’s conclusion ties up loose ends and looks
forward.18 Against the backdrop of up to ten or more million impending foreclosures
to come in the very near future,19 it suggests, we are apt to see many municipal condemnation actions, brought pursuant to sundry specific, locally responsive, finely
tuned variants of the Plan here described, in the months just ahead.
I. The Present Crisis— Root Causes and Structural Dynamics
The nation, the states, the cities, and even the globe remain trapped in the
fallout of a financial crisis whose epicenter comprised, and comprises, a comparatively modest number of U.S. localities.20 The crisis itself was the culmination of a decades-long credit-fueled asset price bubble that focused primarily on residential real
estate. The latter was, and remains, disproportionately located in Florida, California,
and several additional “sun belt” or “sand” states.21
The credit in question, for its part, stemmed in the main from persistent, historically unprecedented trade surpluses that were accumulated over more than a
decade by heavily low-wage labor-endowed new entrants to the liberalized global
economy following the breakup of the old “eastern” bloc of erstwhile socialist nations.22 Flows of this credit were particularly difficult, if not impossible, for domestic
monetary authorities like the U.S. Federal Reserve to “sterilize,” given the openness
of U.S. financial markets to the wider world.23
See infra p. 176.
See infra Part II for this and additional telling statistics. See also infra Part V.
20 As more statistics related infra Part II reveal, affected communities are disproportionately, though certainly not solely, located in Florida, California, and neighboring southwestern states. In this sense, the situation is not unlike that which followed the nation’s last
residential real estate bubble and bust in the late 1920s. See Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance,
supra note 5; see also Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, supra note 11.
21 See supra, note 20; infra, Part II.
22 Notably China and the East Asian “tiger” economies, but also others. See Daniel
Alpert, Robert Hockett, and Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward: Moving Past the Post-Bubble,
Post-Bust Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness, White Paper, New America Foundation, Oct. 2011 [hereinafter Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward].
23 See id.; see also Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0 supra note 6.
18
19
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The theretofore unprecedented “global savings glut,” as then Federal Reserve Governor Ben Bernanke christened it in 2005,24 served as the predicate to a
classic recursive collective action problem of the kind noted above. The hallmark of
these problems, again, is their capacity to bring about situations in which multiple
uncoordinated decisions— even blameless, individually-rational decisions— aggregate into collectively self-damning outcomes.25
Arms races, “bums’ rushes,” bank runs, and busts are familiar examples of
this common phenomenon—as are, in non-recursive form, those game-theoretic perennials known as the “prisoner’s dilemma” and “tragedy of the commons.”26 So too,
we now know, are asset price bubbles and busts.27
The problem in the present instance, with whose sequelae a comparatively
small number of U.S. municipalities continue disproportionately to struggle, unfolded on the one hand pursuant to the classic familiar pattern, while on the other hand
on the strength of the historically anomalous global credit glut just noted.28 For as
long as that surplus of credit remained disproportionately attracted to U.S. dollardenominated assets—as, given the unique global role of the dollar, it was bound to
do for as long as our trading partners declined to recycle them at home—29borrowing
24 See Ben S. Bernanke, The Global Savings Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit:
Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economists, March 10, 2005, available
at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/.
25 See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward supra note 22; see also Hockett, A
Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5; Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, 37 CORNELL L.
FORUM 14 (2011) [hereinafter Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame].
26 See supra note 25. The standard renditions of the prisoner’s dilemma and tragedy
of the commons do not involve feedback effects and accordingly need not be self-worsening.
Indeed, collective action problem-solving conventions can sometimes emerge pursuant to iteration of these situations. What we are calling recursive collective action problems, by contrast,
simply self-worsen with iteration, hence involve either indeterminate equilibria or no
equilibria at all. See Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4; and Hockett,
Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 6.
27 Some of course do not simply “now” know this, but long in effect have observed it.
See supra, notes 25-26. See also the work of Geanakoplos cited infra, note 33, and the important
work on procyclicality in the monetary and financial systems of Tobias Adrian and Hyun Shin.
See, e.g., Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Procyclical Leverage and Value at Risk; FRBNY Staff
Reports, No. 338 (2011), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/
sr338.html; Tobias Adrian et al., Monetary Cycles, Financial Cycles, and the Business Cycle, FRBNY
Staff Reports, No. 421 (2010) [hereinafter Adrian et al., Monetary Cycles], available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr421.html; Tobias Adrian et al., Financial Intermediation, Asset Prices, and Macroeconomic Dynamics, FRBNY Staff Reports, No. 422
(2010), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr422.html [hereinafter Adrian et al., Financial Intermediation]; see also HYUN SONG SHIN, RISK AND LIQUIDITY (2010).
28 See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22.
29 The reasons for hoarding dollar denominated assets have included, inter alia, foreign exchange holding for defense against possible speculative attacks upon domestic currencies of the kind that characterized the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, domestic inflation prevention in the high growth rates at home, possible currency manipulation in order to
maintain exports, and other, less pressing imperatives. See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The
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costs in this country could not but remain low.30 And so they did, for well over a
decade.31
But when (1) credit costs—in the form either of low interest charges or high
obtainable loan-to-value ratios (LTVs—)—remain inexpensive over some lengthy interval, and (2) at some point early on in that interval some discrete class of assets like
real estate and the financial instruments appurtenant to it begin rising in value, for
whatever exogenously given reason, at more rapid rates than the effective interest or
collateral haircut rates, a danger emerges. It quickly becomes rational for more individuals to begin borrowing and buying the assets in question.
Moreover, and more ominously for present purposes, it also becomes rational for at least some individuals—so-called “speculative buyers”—to borrow to buy
only to sell, with a view ultimately to profiting on the widening spread between low
and high borrowing costs, accelerating capital appreciation rates.32 And these comparatively few speculative buyers, crucially, come increasingly to determine the prices that even conservative buyers must pay—and indeed borrow to pay.33
Way Forward, supra note 22; Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 6; see also MARTIN WOLF,
FIXING GLOBAL FINANCE (2d ed. 2010).
30 See supra notes 22-24. Please note that, for the time being at least, with the term
“borrowing costs” I am lumping together credit of the form extended in return for interest
payments and credit that varies with available leverage ratios as determined by varying collateral requirements. There are some contexts and associated purposes for which it is important
to distinguish themthemthese creditsthem, for reasons very well conveyed by Geanakoplos,
see infra note 33. For the moment, the present context is not one of them. The Fed during the era
to which we here allude might have been able to do more by way of reining in credit through
interest rate policy or, more potently, the regulation of leverage ratios. But there were reasons
for the Fed to be cautious about doing so, and the free inflow of credit from abroad under liberal global financial arrangements would have rendered the task both delicate and difficult in
any event. See, e.g., Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22; Hockett, A
Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5; Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 6.
31 See supra notes 22-24.
32 See supra note 25. The assets in question might first begin (moderately) rising in
value for reasons rooted in “fundamentals” – for example, demographic changes that bring
more first-time buyers into housing markets. The problem is that over-abundant credit can
then enable even initially moderate price rises rooted in fundamentals to accelerate into much
steeper price rises rooted in credit-enabled, self-fulfilling price-rise expectations themselves.
33 This point is critical, particularly when questions of blame are on the agenda. One
needed not be a “house-flipper” to get caught up in and thus inadvertently further contribute
to the mortgage bubble dynamic, any more than one need be a “bread-flipper” to be drawn
into and thereby contribute further to the dynamic of a consumer price hyperinflation. Perfectly sober, even regretful parties can be prompted to buy now rather than later simply by rational recognition of the fact that, so long as the inflation or hyperinflation is underway, prices will
be so much higher in future as to render it sensible to buy now rather than later. It also bears
noting that not only speculators, but fraudsters as well can disproportionately determine these
higher market prices that the great majority of sober and honest purchasers must pay. See
Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4; Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance,
supra note 5; Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, supra note 25. Credit for first rigorously modeling the disproportionate influence of “optimists” in a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous investors rests with the prescient and ever-brilliant John Geanakoplos. See John
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Once even a relatively small threshold number of speculative buyers begin
acting on rational “spread-legging” calculations like these, the ensuing credit-fueled
asset appreciation process can become self-accelerating. It can do so, indeed, for as
long as the credit that fuels it remains overabundant. More buying then comes to
mean more price rises, which means greater spreads between low levering costs and
high capital gains, which in turn brings on more expectation of further price rises,
which issues in further accelerated buying—34and so on, for as long as (1) the levering remains inexpensive and (2) there remain further, untapped prospective new entrants to affected markets.35
And again, the comparative minority of speculative buyers in these circumstances increasingly determine the prices that all entrants must pay. Even cautious
“buy and hold” purchasers who would have newly entered the home markets in any
event—a young couple or new family seeking their first home, say—effectively fall
hostage to the decisions of levered-up “house-flippers” whose purchases the credit
glut renders prospectively profitable.36
The real estate bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s was self-accelerating
pursuant to precisely this “feedback loop” pattern. As more investors noticed the
profits to be made by purchasing residences, mortgage-backed securities (MBS), or
associated instruments on low cost credit and then reselling, more were drawn into
or otherwise affected by such transactions.

Geanakoplos, Promises,Promises, in THE ECONOMY AS A COMPLEX EVOLVING SYSTEM II, 285 (W. B.
Arthur et al. eds., 1997); John Geanakoplos, Liquidity, Default, and Crashes: Endogenous Contracts
in General Equilibrium, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS, ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, EIGHTH WORLD CONFERENCE, 2:170 (Cambridge U. Press, 2005) [hereinafter Geanakoplos, Liquidity, Default, and Crashes]; John
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN.1, 436565 (2010) [hereinafter
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle]. The same works highlight the importance of distinguishing
between interest and leverage (collateral) in some critical contexts. They do not reference
fraudsters, but the logic carries over to their case as well.
34 Note again that the accelerated buying might be done by speculators or fraudsters
acting pursuant to profit motives but also might be done by ordinary “buy and hold” buyers
who simply decide to buy sooner rather than later in order to avoid having to pay more at later dates. In this sense the bubble is, again, much like a consumer price hyperinflation, which
can be fueled not only by commodities speculators but also by ordinary consumers hoping to
preempt higher payment requirements apt to set in at later dates.
35 This is of course what accounts for some mortgage originators’ having sought ever
more “marginal” borrowers to whom to lend on ever more risky, “sub-prime” terms – and
even non-marginal buyers to switch into more marginal, higher risk higher return mortgage
arrangements – as the pool of prospective new buyers shrank and the bubble neared its prospective-new-entrant-determined natural limiting perimeter. It also accounts for the uptick in
fraudulent credit practices as the limits of pools of new entrants, and thus of the bubble itself,
were at long last approached. See Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5.
36 It bears noting, moreover, that many of these speculative buyers and fraudsters
whose purchases set the prices that even cautious and honest buyers had to pay purchased
multiple properties, in effect levering up their own influence on prices. See id. at 1225-26.

HOCKETT_IT TAKES A VILLAGE_FINAL_1-17 (DO NOT DELETE)

130

Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance

1/17/2013 3:46 PM

Vol 18:1

Some were of course prompted by speculative profit-seeking for their own
accounts. Others were pressed into participating by clients on whose accounts they
traded.37 Still others were pressed in effect by the speculators themselves, via the
disproportionate impact the latter’s transactions exerted on prices that even ordinary
folk had to pay—and, increasingly, to borrow to pay.38 And as more came to transact
on these terms, prices naturally rose higher, at accelerating rates, increasing profit
opportunities yet further.
In effect, a spontaneously emergent “Ponzi,” or “pyramid” process developed in the nation’s largest primary and secondary real estate markets over the late
1990s and early 2000s —a process that, crucially, required no actual Ponzi or schemer
to commence or persist.39 The non-necessity of any such Ponzi or schemer in these
processes is important. It is precisely the sense in which processes of this sort stem
from classic coordination problems—problems that result from, rather than defying,
individual rationality, even ethically blameless rationality.
This is not to say there was no blame or irrationality during our recent property price bubble; there always is, bubble or no.40 It is only to say that these would
have been inessential, and in that sense did not lie at the core of the crisis.41 All that
was needed was underpriced credit, which was destined to remain underpriced for
as long as the aforementioned capital surpluses built up in Asia and elsewhere over
the years leading into the crisis held out or, worse yet, continued to grow—as they
did.
Hence there is no need to point fingers at anyone—home buyer, lender, or
secondary market investor—in explaining what happened. There is only a need to
clear up the wreckage that these individuals are no better positioned collectively to
clear than they were to prevent.
To appreciate all of this more concretely, it is instructive before moving on to
consider a typical transaction of the era from the distinct points of view of the parties
concerned.
37 Much anecdotal evidence suggests that many hedge fund managers sought to pull
out of or even short real estate during the late stages of the bubble, only to be told by their clients that they would withdraw their funding and invest elsewhere were the managers to do
so. See, e.g., Geanakoplos, Promises, Promises, supra note 33; Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance,
supra note 5.
38 See supra note 33.
39 This is a core message of Hockett, A Fixer-Upper, supra note 5 at 1241, in which the
term “spontaneously emergent Ponzi process” is introduced. See also Hockett, Bubbles, Busts,
and Blame, supra note 25; Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4. Blame there
might have been, but it is altogether unnecessary to explain what happened over the course of
our most recent bubble and bust. The idea of a “naturally occurring Ponzi process” figures
prominently in the exceedingly prescient ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000),
which introduces this critically important idea.
40 See also Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, supra note 25.
41 Id.

HOCKETT_IT TAKES A VILLAGE_FINAL_1-17 (DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2012

It Takes a Village

1/17/2013 3:46 PM

131

From the lender’s or investor’s point of view, then—whether first mortgagee
or second, portfolio loan holder or MBS buyer—it made sense during the boom to
make investments that would have looked less prudent in earlier times, precisely in
virtue of the steady appreciation of collateral wrought by the bubble itself.42 Borrowers were, after all, less apt to default given the luxuriant refinancing opportunities
which that appreciation afforded. And the growing expected values (EVs) of performing loans and underlying collateral more than offset expected losses from incremental default rate increases in any event.43
From the buyer’s point of view, in turn, accepting loans from the mentioned
investors—even “second” such loans, and the higher-cost nonprime, or highercomplexity adjustable rate loans that many originators increasingly channeled them
toward—44made sense both for distinct reasons and for the same reasons that extending this credit made sense to investors. For one thing, as noted above, most buyers
had little choice but to buy on the terms set by the speculator-driven boom market
itself. For another, appreciating home values made refinance easy in any event, well
before adjustable rate mortgage loan payments might adjust upward. Indeed, the
then-esteemed Fed Chairman publicly told buyers as much.45
That of course takes us to the regulators. From many of their points of
view—particularly those who were not charged with overseeing the financial or
monetary systems as integrated wholes—heightened regulatory concern looked unnecessary for counterpart reasons to those just considered.46 Steadily rising home
values meant less risk—less risk to borrower, lender, secondary market investor, and
hence general public alike from the points of view of these non-systemic regulators.47
Much the same calculus appears to have affected, in this case more problematically, the thinking of that authority charged with overseeing our financial system
as one systemically integrated whole on behalf of all actors—that all-important collective monetary agent known as the Fed—48though in this case there were additional, seemingly more compelling reasons to stand back.49
See generally Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5.
Id.
44 For more on the lenders’ channeling even prime borrowers toward more profitable
non-prime loans, see, e.g., Hockett, supra note 5; CHARLES MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR
MELTDOWN (2d. ed. 2010).
45 See, e.g., Greenspan Says Personal Debt is Mitigated by Housing Value, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2004, at C11.
46 See generally Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5 at 1255; Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, supra note 25.
47 Id.
48 See also Robert Hockett, Money, Finance, and Collective Action, 6 J. APP. ECON. (2012)
[hereinafter Hockett, Money, Finance, and Collective Action]. See generally Hockett, supra note 5;
Hockett, supra note 6; Hockett, supra note 25 (discussing the critical role of the central bank or
monetary authority as necessary collective agent in respect of the financial system).
49 See Hockett, supra note 6.
42
43
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One such reason stemmed from the salutary consequences of the “wealth effect” wrought by home price appreciation on consumer demand. These were consequences that were bound to appeal to policy-makers in view of (1) U.S. growth- and
employment-imperiling real wage stagnation from the 1970s onward, combined with
(2) the Fed’s maximum sustainable growth and employment mandates.50
Another seemingly compelling reason for Fed inaction was the fact that it
likely could not fully sterilize incoming credit in any event—at least not without either (1) backtracking on global financial openness, or (2) using blunt policy instruments widely thought apt to kill healthy transaction activity economy-wide.51
In short, then, even blameless decisions taken by all concerned parties, with
the possible exception of that collective agent that is the central bank, would have
been consistent with what we have been through—and, as Part II will soon demonstrate, what we are still going through. It was precisely most parties’ acting in financially defensible manners that enabled the bubble to form, then expand for as long as
the credit remained inexpensive and prospective new entrants to real estate markets
could be tapped.
And for as long as this process continued, in turn, even the great majority of
sober, non-speculative investors and home buyers had to transact on terms set by the
bubble. Home buyers were forced, in other words, to enter into fixed debt obligations, with ever higher principal, simply in order to purchase and inhabit ever more
expensive, speculative-market-valued, variably priced homes.52
Once the pool of prospective new home buyers was finally exhausted, however, and prices in consequence peaked and then plunged, millions of home-buyers
50 See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 22. The mentioned mandate is codified at
12 U.S.C. § 225(a).
51 See Hockett, Bretton Woods 1.0, supra note 6. It is perhaps worth noting, if only in
passing, that scholars at the Bank for International Settlements – notably Claudio Borio and
William White – have been consistently more optimistic about the prospects of “leaning”
(against the proverbial wind) as distinguished from “cleaning” (up after a crash, the policy
preferred in American circles since the end of the Martin and Volcker eras, at any rate). See also
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5; Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, supra note
25; Hockett, Money, Finance, and Collective Action, supra note 48. Cf. William R. White, Should
Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean:” That is the Question? (Bank Negra Malay., Working Paper),
available
athttp://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/conf/hilec2009/s04_sp_white.pdf
(providing a very good overview of the pro-leaning position, with critique of the pro-clean position. The American consensus appears to be shifting now a bit more toward the BIS position
once favored by earlier Fed Chairmen William McChesney Martin and Paul Volcker, but it is
not there yet and could not have been further from it over the course of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The author and his FRBNY colleagues Tobias Adrian and Meg McConnell are now
working along these lines in constructing what we are calling a “macroprudential tool kit.”).
52 See sources cited supra note 33. It should be noted that by “fixed nominal debt obligations” we mean obligations that do not change with market prices, in contrast to variable
market prices themselves. The latter’s varying upward is what opens spreads and makes borrowing to buy more attractive; its varying downward is what leaves debt overhang that can
induce debt deflation.
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could not but now find themselves suddenly “underwater,” hunkering down under
“debt overhang” with “negative equity.” Their variable rate assets—not to mention
lender collateral—had plummeted in value, while their fixed debt obligations had
not. That left them with more in debt obligations—often very much more—than in
underlying home equity.
And as this left the mortgagors vulnerable, of course, so has it left mortgagees
who rely on their payments—along with everyone else whose well-being depends on
the health of the mortgage markets. That, as we will soon see, is all of us.
So this is where much of the nation, and in particular those states and municipalities that have been at the heart of the crisis from the beginning, now find themselves. As of January 2012, fully $7 trillion in household home equity wealth had
been lost since 2006, while nearly one quarter – over 22% – of the 52.5 million mortgaged homes in the U.S. were underwater.53
If for the sake of illustrative case study we concentrate attention on, say, California (“the State”) and one of its counties in particular, San Bernardino (“the County”) – both of which lay at the epicenter of the bubble and bust – the figures are yet
higher: 2 million homes, representing 30% of the total state-wide, and 168,000 homes,
representing 43 % of the total county-wide, were under water.54 These remarkable
numbers are of course but the balance sheet manifestations of slumped and still sagging, record-low post-bubble home prices which, nearly six years after the peak and
the plunge, are down 34% from 2006 levels nationwide, 50 % state-wide, and over
50% county-wide.55
Yet all of this, worrisome as it all is, is not all. Matters are growing yet worse.
Notwithstanding periodically transient, scattered signs of improvement in some
shifting national localities, the S&P Case Shiller 20 City Index now shows home prices down fully 9% from their previous post-bubble high –itself low in relation to longer term trend—reached in 2010.56 The counterpart State and County figures are proportionately worse: approximately 11% for the State, and 14% for the County.57
53 See also Alpert, supra note 22; Michael Campbell & Robert Hockett, White Paper in
Support of the Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Assistance Act of 2012, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987159.
54 For more on why San Bernardino makes for an illustrative case study, see generally
Jennifer Medina, In California, Economic Gap of East vs. West, N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 2012, page 1,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/us/californias-economic-split-pits-westagainst-east.html?pagewanted=all.
55 See www.dqnews.com (providing state figures, reported at $484K in 2007 and
$239K in Feb2012); www.City-Data.com for (providing county figures, reported at approximately $380K in 2007 and $155K in 2011).
56 See Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3; Campbell & Hockett, supra
note 53.
57 See www.dqnews.com (providing state figures, reported at $270K in July 2010 and
$239K in Feb. 2012); www.City-Data.com (providing county figures, reported at approximately $180K in 2010 and $155K in 2011).
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Meanwhile, a backlog of nearly 400,000 homes nationwide awaited liquidation at the
end of 2011, with another 2.86 million mortgages twelve or more months delinquent.58 And again the State and County figures are worse.
The upshot of these numbers is a current “shadow inventory” of some 3.25
million homes nationwide, 174,000 homes state-wide, and 14,000 homes county-wide
that are either already foreclosed or on the brink of foreclosure.59 These are inventories which, as they continue to grow, weigh all the more heavily on home prices,
families, neighborhoods, towns, and the national, state, and local economies.
In light of these trends, widely followed real estate analysts estimate that between 7.4 million and 9.4 million additional home loans nationwide now are at serious risk of default in the coming six years. That is an impending foreclosure tsunami
of apparently unprecedented proportion, rather as our recent bubble and the global
glut fueling it were either unprecedented or only once-precedented.60 And this is assuming no further price declines or interest rate rises.
But alas, owing to feedback effects of the sort sketched above and to be encountered again just below, further such price declines cannot be realistically assumed away.61 Underwater homeowners who live in the shadow of debt overhang
do not spend. That drains growth- and employment-maintaining consumer demand
from the economy. Because homes represent by far the largest store of wealth for the
See supra note 57.
CoreLogic, September 2011.
60 See Strengthening the Housing Market and Minimizing Losses to Taxpayers: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Housing, Transportation and Community Development of the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Laurie S. Goodman, Senior Managing Director, Amherst Securities Group), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore_id=0f96e0ff8500-41a5-a0f2-0139d0df2e07; Laurie Goodman et al., The Case for Principal Reductions, 17 J.
STRUC FIN. 29 (2011); see also Gus Lubin, Laurie Goodman on Why Another 11 Million Mortgages
Will Go Bad, BUS. INSIDER (July 26, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-0726/markets/30092548_1_shadow-inventory-default-rates-loans. The one possible precedent, of
course, is that of the global and U.S. financial and housing economies of the late 1920s and
1930. See Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5 for a reminder that the 1920s featured
a real estate bubble in addition to a financial market bubble, the pairing of which two always
seems to issue in the longest-running post-bust debt deflations. See also Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, (2005). As for
the uncertainty whether the prior case rivaled or surpassed the most recent in magnitude, this
owes to want of data in connection with the previous instance. See Alpert, Hockett & Roubini,
supra note 22. On debt deflations, see the same; the locus classicus, for its part, is of course Irving Fisher, The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 11 ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933).
61 See Fisher, supra note 60; see, e.g., Alpert, Hockett & Roubini, supra note 22; FED.
RESERVE BD., supra note 8; Dudley, supra note 8; Campbell & Hockett, supra note 53 (for further
elaboration of the dynamics described in this paragraph); see also Adrian & Shin, supra note 27;
Adrian et al., Monetary Cycles, supra note 27; Adrian et al., Financial Intermediation, supra note
27; HYUN SONG SHIN, supra note 27; Geanakoplos, Liquidity, Default, and Crash, supra note 33;
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle, supra note 33.
58
59
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great majority of middle class Americans, moreover,62 and because that middle class
in turn represents by far the greatest source of American consumer demand, the drag
on the larger economy is massive. Indeed it is by far the heaviest drag on general
post-crisis recovery.63
To be sure, not all currently troubled mortgages are underwater. Some
homeowners are now facing difficulty keeping current on monthly payments simply
for reasons of temporary un- or underemployment stemming as radial effects from
the broader underwater-mortgage-induced slump. For this class of mortgagor, the
author of this Article and a colleague at the Fed have designed a Home Mortgage
Bridge Loan Assistance Program, informed by a successful Pennsylvania program
put into place during the steel slump of the early 1980s. The bill that would institute
the program, happily, is now poised for adoption in the State of New York.64 But . . .
Critically, however, this class of troubled mortgage is nowhere near being
the principal drag upon mortgage market and more general economic recovery. That
status is overwhelmingly held by underwater mortgages, which default at accelerating rates in proportion to their negative equity, suffer disproportionate losses on liquidation, and radiate through the larger economy pursuant to the feedback mechanisms noted in the previous paragraph but one. And notwithstanding this fact—the
fact that they are the real proverbial “elephant in the room”—they are likewise, ironically, the one class of troubled mortgage about which virtually nothing has been
done. This in turn stems from what turn out to be yet more coordination challenges
that we elaborate next, in Part II.
Our foreclosure crisis, then, bad enough already, is prone to continued selfworsening just as the bubble from which it proceeds was self-augmenting. Mass
foreclosures and expected foreclosures further depress home prices, which further
depress consumer expenditures, which further depress employment and income,
which further heighten the incidence of default and foreclosure, which further de-

62 This is another important motif in the work of Robert Shiller. See SHILLER, supra
note 39; see also ROBERT SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION (2008); ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE (2d ed., 2005) (with addition chapters on the housing bubble); ROBERT SHILLER,
THE NEW FINANCIAL ORDER (2003); ROBERT SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS (1993); Robert Hockett,
Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and New
Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy”,
25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, (2004).
63 For interesting anecdotal evidence as well as citations to multiple empirical studies
by University of Chicago economist Amir Sufi, see Binyamin Appelbaum, Where Housing Once
Boomed, Recovery Lags, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 2012, at A1.
64 See Michael V. Campbell & Robert C. Hockett, N.Y City Bar,
Proposal to Adopt the Home Mortgage Bridge Loan Program, app. A (2012), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/9_20072233BridgeLoanAssistanceProgram.pdf; see also Campbell & Hockett, supra note 53.
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press home prices—and so on, snowballing again.65 And all of this, of course, correspondingly lessens the real value of those balance-sheet-overvalued assets—
mortgage loans, MBS, and associated instruments—still on the books of the primary
and secondary investors whose claims these properties secure.66 No one, in other
words, is spared.
The interested parties, meanwhile, hang back in holding patterns or “kick”
the proverbial “can down the road,” many apparently hoping for “some miracle to
happen” before the reality of more mass foreclosure, eviction, property degradation
and booked asset devaluation, all temporarily stayed until recently by “robosigning”
scandal-induced caution, recommences.67 This waiting, itself rooted in coordination
hurdles of the same sort as enabled the bubble and bust in the first place, is what
now permits the downward spiraling to continue. Only a plan of the form drawn up
below, pursuant to which municipalities act as collective agents for the fragmented
parties, can reverse the self-worsening trend. The following Part explains why.
II. What Has to Happen—and Why It Does Not
Home prices are not going to rise back to pre-crisis, boom-period levels. If
they were, it would not have been a bubble that we’ve just experienced. The excesscredit-fueled, artificially overvalued housing market just was that bubble, hence is
65 A few numbers prove telling: The National Association of Realtors, in its December 2011 survey, finds that foreclosure sales on average result in a discount of 22% relative to
non-distressed home sales. (That compares to 20% as of December 2010.) Short sales, for their
part, averaged 13% below market. Id. And these are conservative estimates, inasmuch as
RealtyTrac has found even larger discounts.
66 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Board, supra note 8; Dudley, supra note 8; Campbell &
Hockett, supra note 53.
67 For reasons addressed in full further below in this Part, programs like the federal
government’s Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP) and Home Affordable Refinance
Program (HARP) have been notably unsuccessful. For one thing, only 2.26 million out of 14
million troubled mortgagors have modified their mortgages under these costly programs. For
another, more troubling thing, fewer than 50% of these 2.26 million themselves were still current at year-end 2011. The reason is clear: Neither program has successfully addressed the
underwater mortgage problem head on by bringing significant principal reductions to affected
mortgages. Most modifications have simply capitalized previously missed mortgage payments
or reduced monthly payments by less than 10%. But it is overwhelmingly underwater mortgages that default. See, e.g. Hearing, Goodman, supra note 60; Goodman et al., supra note 60;
Lubin, supra note 60; see also Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 22; Christopher L.Chris
Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston
Federal
Government
Policy
Discussion
Papers
08-3
(2008),
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2008/ppdp0803.pdf. No plan of action that does
not make significant use of principal modification so as to bring earlier, bubble-priced debt into line with current, post-bubble collateral value will do anything more than put off the inevitable day of re-reckoning, and in so doing worsen the losses and harms mentioned above and
catalogued more fully below. See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 22; see also 1. Also
Federal Reserve Board, supra note 8; Dudley, supra note 8; Campbell & Hockett, supra note 53.
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precisely what brought us the crisis through which we’re now living. Against that
backdrop, the only conceivable options for ending the ongoing crisis are either (1) to
restart and resume the bubble itself via some heretofore undiscovered artifice,68 or (2)
to revalue assets and liabilities formally as the markets themselves have begun doing
realistically.69 Reflate the bubble, or in other words, bringing variable rate assets
back into line with the fixed debt obligations that financed their purchase, or trim
back the debt obligations themselves: write down principal.
A.

What Has to Happen: Large-Scale Principal-Reduction

Since option (1), for its part, is at best only conceivable, and not really practicable or desirable,70 option (2) then is the only realistic and desirable possibility. Debt
must be trimmed back to eliminate negative equity, else the time-honored correlation
between high loan-to-value LTV ratios and default find expression in more rounds of
foreclosure. It isn’t a question of whether, but when—and how. We can act to ensure
that the overhung debt’s written off in an orderly, expeditious, well managed manner that is equitable, efficient, and value-preserving for all. Or we can continue to sit
back and watch things unfold in a manner that proves chaotic, uncertainty-fraught,
inequitable and colossally wasteful.71
68 Some have proposed the artifice of more central bank purchases of MBS, others –
for example, Ken Rogoff and, more recently, Paul Krugman – the artifice of targeted higher
consumer price inflation. See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, The Bullets Yet to Be Fired to Stop the Crisis,
FIN. TIMES, August 8, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1e0f0efe-c1a9-11e0-acb300144feabdc0.html#axzz1s3nCG5bY; Paul Krugman, Not Enough Inflation, N.Y.NEW TIMES,
April 5, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/opinion/krugman-notenough-inflation.html?_r=1.
These would amount to mere partial reflation of the bubble, but are nevertheless suboptimal
for reasons elaborated in Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 22. One reason is that the proverbial inflation “genie” is difficult to get back into the “bottle” once out. The other is that inflation tends disproportionately to harm old-age pensioners and those with lower incomes, at
least unless and until we are prepared to countenance central bank targeting of more asset
classes in open market operations, per Robert Hockett, How To Make QE More Helpful: By Fed
Shorting
of
Commodities,
BENZINGA
FINANCE
(Oct.
14,
2011),
http://www.benzinga.com/news/11/10/1988109/how-to-make-qe-more-helpful-by-fedshorting-of-commodities#.
69 See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, supra note 22; Hearing, supra note 60; see also Campbell & Hockett, supra note 53.
70 See supra note 69.
71 It should be noted that, in view of the losses entailed by default and foreclosure
themselves, markets value foreclosure-prone properties and associated MBS at rates even lower than marked-down and accordingly no-longer foreclosure-prone properties and associated
MBS. Hence the Municipal Plan, the details of which are laid out in Part III of this Article,
should restore home, mortgage, and MBS values to pre-crisis levels, just not bubble-era levels.
For more on the way in which the same recursive collective action problem as results in artificially overvalued assets during a bubble results in artificially undervalued assets during a
bust, see Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, supra note 11; see also Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4; Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5.

HOCKETT_IT TAKES A VILLAGE_FINAL_1-17 (DO NOT DELETE)

138

1/17/2013 3:46 PM

Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance

Vol 18:1

All parties recognize this. So do commentators across a broad spectrum,
running from Reagan Administration economist Martin Feldstein to grassroots
progressivist outfits like MoveOn.org, and from top mortgage insurer Radian Group
to top bond fund PIMCO. What then prevents interested parties writing down principal accordingly? What blocks their acting in their own best interests?
In light of what has been noted above about coordination problems, it will be
recognized at once that this is not unlike asking what prevents all parties from exiting safely from a burning theatre. Actions that would be taken by multiple parties in
situations like that in which we now find ourselves, if they would not be selfdefeating, must be orchestrated. They inherently pose collective action challenges
that properly authorized collective agents—in effect, orchestral conductors—must
address on behalf of the many diffuse parties concerned.
In this sense, the present revaluation impasse—the challenge to plenary
principal write-downs—just is the flipside of the precedent bubble itself.72 Much as it
was individually rational and indeed unavoidable, absent forceful Fed regulation of
leverage conditions, for individual market actors to enter into transactions that ultimately aggregated into the bubble, and just as it is individually rational, absent direction, for each theatergoer to press toward the exit on learning of fire, so is it rational
for each creditor post-bubble, absent combined orchestration, to await others’ revaluing first.
B.

Why It Does Not Happen: Structural and Contractual Impediments

Why? There are several reasons to catalogue, but the most “deep-structural”
one is that the last to revalue in such circumstances ultimately faces the least need to
revalue. Everyone else’s revaluing eliminates debt overhang, thereby lowers aggregate default risk, and so raises property prices. That in turn lessens the degree to
which any last mortgage remains underwater—indeed it will probably lift it above
water. Every mortgagee therefore has reason to wish to be last, rather as each fleeing
theatre-goer has reason to wish to be first.73 All accordingly wait for the others to act,
in effect reenacting the Vaudeville routine in which two parties first try to crowd
through one door, then step back, each saying, “after you.” Under such circumstances, no one gets anywhere.74
72 See Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, supra note 11; Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4.
73 The symmetry here is no accident. Note that bubble participants also have reason
to wish to be first – as do runners on banks and on assets in busts.
74 The shtick is often associated with the French cartoon characters Alphonse and
Gaston. See, e.g., Alphonse and Gaston, WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alphonse
_and_Gaston. (Thanks to Bob Shiller for finding and sending the image.) The situation is also
reminiscent of that posed by the apocryphal Kansas statute reported in Prosser’s canonical
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This is of course problem enough, “deep-structural” as it is. And yet it is but
one of the full cluster of collective action problems we face where would-be plenary
principal write-down is concerned. For there are many additional impediments, most
rooted in contractual practices begun during the boom years which few thought
would end, to privately ordered loan modification in contemporary mortgage markets. It will be helpful here to brisklyto briskly catalogue the most formidable of these. Doing so renders all the more clear why the Plan sketched below is so urgently
necessary.
The first additional impediment to plenary mortgage loan modification,
then, stems from the securitization arrangements pursuant to which most contemporary mortgage loans are now held—arrangements which, we shall see, are accordingly the first targets of the plan we propose below. The fragmentation of ownership interests both in pools of mortgage loans and, thereby, even the individual mortgage
loans themselves, renders it impossible for creditors to act in concert to modify underlying loans.75 There is no way for these hundreds of thousands of people even to
find one another, let alone act together. In effect, mortgage loan pooling puts the traditional creditor coordination problem, endemic to all situations involving multiple
creditors, “on steroids,” if one may speak in the current vernacular.
The problem is rendered yet worse by pool tranching structures that can
place some pool participants—for example, senior and junior tranches—at odds with
each other where the timing of modification is concerned: the so-called “tranch warfare” problem.76 And this is not even to mention the fact that each pool holds multiple loans, each distinct one of which would have to be dealt with, in the event of impending insolvency, by the fragmented and fragmented-interest-holding creditors.77
The second additional impediment to plenary loan modification likewise
stems from the securitization arrangements that proliferated during, and indeed
helped to fuel, the real estate bubble. Because securitized creditors are too dispersed
to act in concert, as just noted, the pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) pursuant
to which mortgage loans are aggregated vest authority to collect loan payments in a
single collective agent—the servicer, typically a banking institution. But the same
PSAs’ terms often flatly prohibit, or otherwise strictly limit—for example, through

casebook on the law of tort: The statute purportedly required, of any two trains nearing each
other from opposed directions, that each train stop and await the other one’s passage.
75 In theory, of course, indenture trustees and servicers are charged with the task of
acting on behalf of the dispersed creditors; but as will become apparent below, the PSAs pursuant to which securitization trusts are formed typically limit these agents’ capacities to do
what needs doing right now. See generally Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3.
76 Supra note 75.
77 Supra note 75.
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supermajority consent requirements—servicers from modifying pooled loans.78 They
also prohibit or limit their selling such loans.79 So the one party explicitly vested with
collective agency to act on behalf of our fragmented creditors and their financial
wellbeing is contractually impeded from taking the one action that is most needful
right now for the creditors themselves—expected value (EV) maximizing principal
reduction.
A distinct but related obstacle here is that PSAs also determine the compensation arrangements pursuant to which servicers are paid. These arrangements,
made during the boom years with no evident thought that a property price bubble,
bust, or consequent default and foreclosure tsunami might occur, overwhelmingly
place servicer compensation incentives at variance with lenders’ and borrowers’ value-preserving loan modification interests.80
In the vicinity of borrower insolvency, residential mortgage-backed security
(RMBS) servicer fees generally are independent of borrower payments. The upshot is
that servicers often fare better financially over a 12 to 18 month period of borrower
default than over any comparable period of debt renegotiation, restructuring, and
payment resumption. Meanwhile, (1) the aforementioned fragmentation of securitized residential mortgage investors, and (2) counterpart dispersion, accompanied by
missing information, demoralization, and weak bargaining power on the part of bor78 Supra note 75; see also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency &, Office of Thrift
Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metric Report, Third Quarter 2008 (Dec. 2008),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/
mortgage-metrics-q3-2008/mortgage-metrics-q3-2008-pdf.pdf); Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency & Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and OTS Mortgage Metric Report, Fourth
Quarter 2008 (Apr. 2009), http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-bytype/other-publications-reports/mortgage-metrics-q4-2008/mortgage-metrics-q4-2008pdf.pdf; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency & Office of Thrift Supervision, OCC and
OTS
Mortgage
Metric
Report,);
First
Quarter
2009
(June
2009),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publicationsreports/mortgage-metrics-q1-2009/mortgage-metrics-q1-2009-pdf.pdf;). Tomasz Piskorski et
al, Securitization and Distressed Loan Negotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
(2010),
Chicago
Booth
School
of
Business
Research
Paper,
No.
09-02,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1321646; John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan Modification? Preliminary Results and Implications,
Mar.
25,
2009,
working
paper,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369286; Credit Suisse, The Day After
Tomorrow: Payment Shocks and Loan Modifications (2007).
79 Supra note 78. Hence, incidentally, one of the attractions of legally mandated sale –
compensated taking under eminent domain authority – as proposed infra, Part III.
80 See, e.g., sources cited supra, note 78. See also Larry Cordell et al, The Incentives of
Mortgage Servicers: Myths and Realities (Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of
Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., Working
Paper
No.
46,
2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/revision/200846pap.pdf; and Sarah
Bloom Raskin, Putting the Low Road Behind Us, Remarks at the Midwinter Housing Finance
Conference,
Park
City,
Utah
(February
11,
2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/raskin20110211a.htm.
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rowers, conspire to impede any spontaneous development of more incentivealigning servicer compensation arrangements.81
Another distinct but related point is that the residential real estate loan servicing industry, whose personnel, practices, and technologies also were retained during times when the prospect of system-wide bust and foreclosure were not contemplated, has simply been overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of the bust. Neither
the numbers and specializations of personnel, nor the technologies by which documents are maintained and retrieved, have been equipped to respond to the scale of
the problem we’re now living with.
This is so whether the scale in question be measured in numbers of loans,
amounts owed on loans, or numbers of heterogeneous PSAs carrying distinct sets of
terms and requirements with which servicers must comply. It is ultimately this circumstance that accounts for both the aforementioned “robosigning” scandals of two
years ago, and the recommendation of “sub-servicer” arrangements for still troubled
loans in the recently proposed settlement between Bank of America and a number of
institutional investors.82
The third additional impediment to plenary loan modification stems from a
surprising turn taken by the familiar divergence of interest between first and second
lienholders on mortgage loans. It turns out that seconds possess significant “holdup”
power over would-be value-preserving modification arrangements between borrowers and firsts, notwithstanding their subordinate status to those firsts. This power operates through another power that seconds in turn hold over borrowers.
In essence, the problem emerges from two conjoined facts.83 The first is that
“firsts—” — even when able to act in concert, or when not having to do so because
holding single portfolio loans—do not benefit by loan modification unless “seconds”
modify too. This is simply a consequence of the familiar observation, sometimes
made in connection with “tranch warfare” situations of the sort mentioned above,
that creditors in the “first loss” position likewise are first to benefit by principal re81 See Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3. It is interesting to note, by
way of contrast, that in the securitized commercial real estate mortgage market the sizes of individual loans in the pools appear to have rendered lenders and borrowers more active in negotiating more incentive-aligning servicer compensation arrangements. Here securitized
commercial loan servicers divide into two specialties – transaction processors and loss
mitigators, with delinquent loan payments triggering shifts in responsibility from the former
to the latter. The latter, in turn, are paid in proportion to restructured loan performance, rather
than in the form of fees that are independent of such performance.
82 See, e.g., Goodman, sources cited supra note 60, for more on the bust’s overwhelming of servicers. See also Hockett, Six Years on and Still Counting, supra note 3. Note, in addition
in this connection, the contrast with servicing arrangements in the commercial real estate
mortgage markets, as described supra note 82. The Bank of America settlement is available at
http://www.cwrmbssettlement.com/docs/Exh%20B.pdf.
83 See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22; see also Hockett, Six
Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3.
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duction. The second operative fact is that “seconds” reap greater benefit by not agreeing to modifications, thanks to a power they hold over distressed mortgagors in virtue of the latter’s liquidity needs when financially strapped.84
A squeezed borrower who cannot afford to make all payments required of
her in a given month, and who must accordingly fall behind on something, will typically allow herself to fall behind on her first rather than her second mortgage loan.
The reason is that default on the latter—typically a home equity line of credit
(HELOC)—means loss of capacity to pay for anything else, including the things she
must purchase to live and to work while endeavoring to dig herself out of debt. Default on the former, by contrast, triggers a lengthy foreclosure process that affords
“breathing room” in which to attempt to put life back in order.85 Hence seconds
have both holdup power and incentive to exercise it, while firsts and their borrowers
are unable to benefit by the modification that both need and want until seconds stop
wielding that power.
What is legally perverse here, of course, is that second lienholders in effect
can use power they hold over mortgagors to seize priority status from prior mortgagees—first lienholders. In so doing they can prevent value-preserving loan modifications even by portfolio lenders who are not faced with the extra coordination challenges, described just above, that RMBS investors face.
Since some $873 billion in second lien term mortgages and HELOC mortgage
loans, most of them seconds, weigh on a large portion of the most deeply underwater
first mortgage loans nationwide, this impediment is particularly costly.86 In our
sample representative county, moreover, this problem, like most of the state’s and
the nation’s mortgage-related problems, is proportionally worse. HELOCs in San
Bernardino amount to a significant portion of mortgage debt.
But there is more here. Ironically, the servicer incentive problem mentioned a
moment ago dovetails with the HELOC holdup problem. Why? Because in many cases the servicer itself is the HELOC second lien holder!87 There is accordingly a conflict of interest to buttress the aforementioned PSA, compensation, and
“overwhelmedness” impediments to servicers’ agreeing to loan sales or principal reductions. Against this backdrop, the lack of plenary principal reductions of the sort
that would end our ongoing and still self-worsening mortgage crisis could hardly be
less surprising.
C.

Why It Does Not Happen: HAMP, HARP, and GSE Shortcomings

84
85
86
87

See supra note 83.
See supra note 83.
See Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22.
See Goodman, sources cited supra, note 60.
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But wait, one might now interject, what about the federal Home Affordable
Mortgage Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP)?
And how about the loans held by the government sponsored entities (GSEs) Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac—and the MBS held by the Federal Reserve System through,
for example, the New York Fed’s Maiden Lane funds? Are these not significant sites
of potentially helpful federal intervention through which principal might be widely
writ-down? Can the federal government not act, by dint of its multiple concentrated
ownership stakes, as that collective agent which is evidently required to solve that
thus far intractable collective action problem which is our ongoing and still selfworsening mortgage crisis?
Alas, it seems not—at least not to the requisite degree. The reasons are once
again many. The most tenacious is probably the ideologically divided U.S. Congress,88 combined with the fact that the first costs and immediate urgency of our nation’s self-worsening mortgage crisis are experienced more directly by the localities
in which mortgaged property is located than by the more remotely located federal
government.89 These facts alone render the federal government unlikely to purchase
possession of mortgage loans outright with a view to restructuring or refinancing
them, or even to refinance those they already hold. But there is yet more to the story.
It is true that some federal instrumentalities already possess large pools of
mortgage loans or associated securities in such manner as might help enable restructuring. The aforementioned Fed funds of course hold some. But these represent only
a fraction of all such outstanding and have in any event been held from the start with
a view not to holding them indefinitely, but instead for the short term until markets
recover. The purpose from the outset has been to address liquidity crises faced by a
number of large financial intermediaries whose balance sheets were widely believed
to hold unsustainable quantities of “toxic” assets in 2008. That limited purpose in
turn limited the kind and quantity of assets purchased, and of course also is why the
Fed now is selling them off at a profit.

88 One might partly pun here by saying that there is yet another “collective action
problem” in this case, since the deeply divided Congress is simultaneously (a) evenly divided
and (b) operating in its Senate subject to supermajority voting requirements – the classic recipe
for “gridlock.”
89 “First” costs, “immediate” urgency, and “more directly” because the first costs are
the foreclosures, attendant evictions, property value and attendant revenue base declines, and
like harms elaborated more fully infra, Parts III and V, which affected localities experience
unmediated – a fact which will figure into the justification of recourse to municipal eminent
domain infra. Later costs experienced by the nation at large are “mediated” and “less direct”
because they involve radial effects of mortgage debt overhang and foreclosure on consumer
spending, growth, and employment in the macro-economy – costs which some members of
Congress evidently do not realize stem more from the ongoing mortgage crisis than, say, from
women’s use of contraceptives or the President’s birth certificate.
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Fannie and Freddie could have been—and still might turn out to be—a
somewhat different story. The GSEs do hold significant numbers of loans for which
they could in theory write down principal. The principal holdups in this case appear
to be three, two of them apparently rooted in one source. The first is that Fannie and
Freddie themselves use thousands of distinct servicers to service the loans that they
hold, meaning that the “overwhelmed servicer” impediment mentioned above could
prove operative here too. But this is the least serious of the GSE holdups.
The second holdup is that many underwater GSE loans—somewhere on the
order of 50%—are subject also to second liens, meaning that Fannie and Freddie also
face the HELOC obstacle noted above. Were they or their regulator and, for the time
being, conservator—the Federal Housing Finance Authority (FHFA)—to “play hardball” with the second lien holders, principal write downs might be somewhat more
common. But the current acting director of the agency seems, for the time being at
least, to be rather reluctant to “strong arm” the banking institutions that hold these
second liens.90
90 There are some very tentative signs that this could change, in light of the present
acting director’s recent remarks made at the Brookings Institution and his January letter to
Congressman Cummings cited immediately below, to the effect that FHFA is assessing the
prospect of principal reduction. Were such change to occur, Fannie and Freddie could possibly
prove to be helpful federal complements to the municipalities on whose behalves I am here
arguing by doing with the loans that they hold something like what Part III prescribes that the
municipalities do with the loans they purchase through condemnation from private label securitization trusts. More on this infra. It also bears noting here that Professor Jackson’s proposal,
supra note 11, and the author’s 2008 proposal noted in the same place, would have amounted
to means very similar to these for achieving much the same end. Insofar as the current acting
director of FHFA changes his mode of thinking here, then, he will be moving in the 2008 Jackson and Hockett directions. It is also important to note, however, that the prospective principal
reductions now being assessed by FHFA would operate in tandem with HAMP, meaning that
they would require significant “incentive” payments by Treasury. That means both (1) that
current FHFA thinking on principal reduction, were it to issue in actual such reduction, would
also entail significant expense to the public fisc, and (2) that the EV calculation by reference to
which the decision is to be made is stacked against FHFA approval of principal reduction. In
fact, in FHFA’s current calculations, as registered at pp. 18-19 of the Brookings address cited
immediately below, HAMP-required servicer incentive payments made by Treasury ($3.9 billion) would be more than double the EV gain enjoyed by Fannie and Freddie ($1.7 billion). All
of this, if accurate, suggests both that the publicly cost-less Plan outlined below in Part III is
both (1) just about infinitely more dollarwise efficient than HAMP-hampered principal reduction as currently contemplated by FHFA, and (2) infinitely more likely to occur as well.
For the Brookings remarks, see Edward DeMarco, Addressing the Weak Housing Market: Is Principal Reduction the Answer?, (April 10, 2012), available at http://www.brookings.edu/
events/2012/0410_housing_demarco.aspx. For the mentioned letter, see Letter from Edward
DeMarco, Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency to Congressman Elijah
Cummings, Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (January 20,
2012) available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23056/PrincipalForgivenessltr12312.pdf.
Note finally that Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22, and Laurie
Goodman, supra note 60, offer helpful means of avoiding any risk of principal-reductioninduced moral hazard of the sort with which FHFA might be concerned. (See, e.g., concerns
noted at page 19 of the Brookings Remarks.). The Federal Reserve and FRBNY President Bill
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The third reason that Fannie and Freddie do not, at least yet, engage in significant principal write downs likewise takes root in the present way of thinking of
the current acting director of FHFA. The thinking in this case is apparently that, because FHFA as public conservator of the GSEs must safeguard their assets to safeguard the fisc, writing down principal on GSE-held loans would compromise its
statutory duty.
This is of course sound thinking only if writing down principal on underwater loans either lowers the EVs of the loans or entails costs that exceed EV benefits. If,
by contrast, writing down principal significantly lowers default risk—which it
does—and thereby increases EVs by more than whatever administrative or other
costs would be entailed by the write downs, the long term fisc-preservation mission
is actually better effected by writing down principal. That opens an interesting door.
It should be noted at this juncture that the likelihood of principal write
downs’ increasing the EVs of particular loans increases with the aggregate number of
written down loans—a compositional corollary of the first, “deep structural” collective action impediment to privately managed principal write downs noted above.91
But this means that the acting FHFA director’s present way of thinking is more
sound insofar as the GSEs and any entities that might coordinate with them collectively hold fewer loans, and less sound insofar as the GSEs and any entities that
might coordinate with them collectively hold more loans. Such coordinating entities
might include, of course, municipalities.
The current acting director’s recent acknowledgement that principal write
downs at least might ultimately prove to be in the public’s interest, as noted above in
note 92, is accordingly very welcome. For it signals that municipalities’ efforts pursuant to the Plan we elaborate below in Part III might ultimately be enhanced by diminished GSE passivity. The GSEs’ coordinating with municipalities, or even conveying
their underwater mortgages to them for fair market value, would effectively magnify
the degree of collective agency exercisable by government instrumentalities in modifying underwater mortgage loans. That would in turn maximize system-wide EVs
and minimize, if not indeed eliminate, cost to the fisc.
Dudley, supra note 8, also endorse such readily available means of hazard mitigation. Finally,
see also HUD Secretary Donovan’s recent interventions on this subject, e.g., Housing Secretary
Pushes
Mortgage
Write-Downs,
REUTERS,
April
6,
2012,
available
at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/06/us-usa-housing-idUSBRE8350MS20120406.
91 As noted above, the last to write down principal has least reason to write down
principal owing to the appreciation of home prices in response to the lessened default risk system-wide wrought by others’ principal write downs. This is a compositional—“whole greater
than the sum of its parts”—phenomenon, more extreme versions of which are those marketwide aggregate overvaluations known as bubbles and market-wide aggregate undervaluations
known as busts. See generally Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 4;
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 5; Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, supra
note 11.
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It will be helpful, then, as suggested above in introducing this article and as
we shall see more fully verified presently, to think of the GSEs as potential complements to state municipalities in solving that ongoing collective action problem which
is the self-worsening mortgage crisis. For when the municipalities begin temporarily
purchasing mortgage loans and writing down principal per the Municipal Plan elaborated below, total public holdings of underwater mortgage loans will be all the
greater.
The acting FHFA director will then have little remaining reason to suppose
that the GSEs’ joining in to write down principal will have any but salutary effects on
the fisc. Indeed he might wish to convey GSE-held loans to the municipalities themselves as suggested above, in view of the Municipal Plan’s avoidance of any public
expenditure—a feature that even GSE writedowns under the current regime would
not have in operating in tandem with HAMP, to which we turn next.
How about HAMP and HARP, then? Are they not programs that involve
collective agency at the federal level, such as can solve those collective action challenges that underwrite our ongoing and self-worsening mortgage market slump?
Alas, not really. Here we are back to impediments that sound less in deep-structural
challenge to collective action and more in contractual and political such challenges,
along with certain programmatic limitations.
To begin with HARP, here the principal problem takes the form of programmatic limitation. HARP simply is not meant for principal reduction. It’s an interest-reduction program for GSE-held loans. Such a program can be helpful, of
course, just as can bridge loan assistance of the sort mentioned earlier. But HARP is
not designed to address the core problem—which is, again, the urgent need of principal reduction.
HAMP, for its part, encourages some principal modification and, more so,
less ambitious forms of loan modification. It does so pursuant to the so-called “waterfall” sequencing, which relies first on interest reduction, then on term extension,
then on principal forbearance, and as a last resort on principal forgiveness. HAMP
has, moreover, even come increasingly to contemplate principal reduction since 2010
through the then-introduced Principal Reduction Alternative (PRA) for which Treasury recently has announced an intention to triple incentive payments made to creditors who opt for it.
The problem, however, is that because HAMP does not involve any collective agents actually taking possession of loans, it continues to be hampered, if one
might be pardoned a pun, by the last several impediments listed above. It also occasions costs to the fisc that are not only regrettable in themselves if avoidable, but also
problematic for purposes of GSE-sought principal reduction. Again, in other words,
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we see interlocking and mutual reinforcing among the many impediments we must
catalogue. We sketch the problems in turn.
First, then, HAMP cannot bring fragmented parties in interest together any
more than those parties themselves can find one another and surmount their conflicts
of interest. Second, it cannot readily undo PSA unanimity or supermajority requirements. Third, it cannot readily undo contractual limitations on servicers’ writing
down principal or selling off loans. And fourth, it cannot seem to handle the second
lien problem, particularly in view of the favorable treatment that HAMP’s Second
Lien Modification Program (2MP) affords seconds at the effective expense of firsts. In
these senses, HAMP suffers all the impediments to parties’ themselves writing down
principal catalogued above.
What can HAMP do well, then? All it can do well is to address one of the
servicer incentive problems noted above. That is helpful, of course, only for loans
that do not suffer the aforementioned contractual prohibitions. Moreover, and more
damning, the only method that HAMP has to address the servicer incentive problem
is to bribe the servicers. This it does in the form of payments of the PRA sort noted
above.
In other words, HAMP works, when it works at all, through means that involve significant public expenditure—which, again as we shall see below, the Plan
we propose here does not. And this will remain the case even should GSEs begin
writing down principal in conjunction with HAMP as noted above and in note 92.
That might afford yet more reason for GSEs themselves to go the route of the Plan we
propose here in Part III, by conveying their underwater loans to municipalities for
fair market value, and perhaps even participating in the financing of these acquisitions, like PLSTs and investors themselves as described below.
None of this is to denigrate HAMP or HARP, which have enjoyed notable
successes and even have marginally increased the rate at which they are managing to
secure principal reductions on troubled loans in the case of HAMP, and marginal
foreclosure prevention through refinance in the case of HARP. It is only to say that
these programs are unnecessarily costly and inherently limited by the baroque methodologies they employ or programmatic restrictions to which they are subject where
addressing the underwater mortgage crisis is concerned.
These programs can help significantly—albeit at taxpayer expense—with
mortgages that are not underwater. And HAMP for its part can even induce principal reductions—at yet heftier taxpayer expense—in those relatively few cases where
PSAs and servicer conflicts do not stand in the way. But in these capacities they are at
best marginal complements to a bona fide principal-focused strategy. We shall see
shortly that only municipalities are well situated to embark on that strategy.
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These, then, are the principal impediments that have stood in the way, and
still stand in the way, of senior and junior first lien holders, second lien holders, borrowers and even servicers who might otherwise have acted in concert by now to
modify mortgage loans so as to render them payable, eliminate debt overhang, and
maximize salvageable post-bubble mortgage and collateral value for all. There have,
to be sure, been additional potential impediments. These include provisions promulgated under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) until 2009,92 accounting standards
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) as of 2008,93 and
possibly the Trust Indenture Act (TIA) of 1939, although the latter has not been litigated.94 But because all of these would have served solely as “fallback” impediments
92 Sections 860A through 860G of the IRC, as interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service under its Revenue Procedures and Treasury Regulations at least until September 2009,
conditioned the pass-through tax treatment of those Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) that hold securitized mortgages upon strict passivity. Modifications of underlying mortgage loans, for their part, were treated until recently as departures from the required
passivity. Hence securitized mortgage obligations up to that point could be modified only on
pain of significant back-tax penalty. Changes made by the IRS to the text of its Revenue Procedures (see Rev. Proc. 2009-45) and Treasury Regulations (see Section 1.860G-2) in midSeptember of 2009, however, which apply retroactively to early 2008, have arguably removed
this erstwhile impediment to loan modification. That was the intention, at any rate. See
Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3. In the absence of any real capacity on the
part of MBS holders actually to find one another and work together with mortgagors to modify underlying loans, however, this salutary change to the tax rules is for present purposes unhelpful. See Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3.
93 For a loan originator, who typically continues on as a servicer, to realize a gain on
the sale of a loan to a REMIC trust and remove the loan form its balance sheet as it aims to do,
the trust to which it sells the loan must be “qualified” under the accounting standards as
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and employed by the SEC
in its regulatory roles. This in turn legally requires that the originator retain no “control” over
the assets. See Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, Paras. 8-13 (Financial Accounting
Standard Board 2008). Although (a) the standards do not elaborate on what counts as “control,” and (b) some SEC staff have opined that modifications of imminently defaulting loans
probably would not count as “control” of the sort that would shift assets back to originator/servicer balance sheets (see Letter from Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, to Rep. Barney
Frank, Chairman of Comm. on Fin. Servs., US House of Representatives (July 24, 2007)), there
is sufficient uncertainty on the matter as to render the avoidance of modification prudent in
the eyes of cautious originator/servicers. As in the case of the tax provisions discussed supra,
note 94, however, it is not clear that this source of uncertainty is decisive, given the already
formidable task would-be loan modifying principals would face in attempting to find one another and then act in concert with mortgagors to restructure underlying loans. See also Hockett,
Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3.
94 Though the question does not appear ever to have been litigated, the terms of the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (TIA), which apply to all corporate
bonds including residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), would seem to require unanimous consent among bondholders before rights to receive principal and interest payments on
the securities could be altered. That in turn could be expected to operate as an impediment to
modifying the terms of underlying mortgage loans – assuming, as seems plausible enough,
that such alterations would result in alterations to payments into the legal entity on whose behalf the servicer collects on underlying mortgages before distributing proceeds to RMBS hold-
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behind the more fundamental and more direct obstacles to joint coordination just
catalogued,95 any plan that might substitute for interested party coordination will effectively sidestep all impediments to loan modification and revaluation. That is precisely what the Municipal Plan does.
III. The Municipal Plan—Structure and Operational Details
We now turn to the main event—the combined condemnation, compensation, and mortgage loan modification Plan best able to end the still dragging, selfworsening mortgage foreclosure crisis laid out and structurally characterized above.
This Part lays out the Plan’s fundamental attributes and financial features. The subsequent Part lays out its legal contours and constitutional underpinnings.
The Municipal Plan is designed specifically to sidestep all of the unnecessary
impediments that presently block meaningful debt revaluation and attendant value
maximization. It does so by forthrightly recognizing the challenge for what it is, then
addressing it accordingly.
The challenge, again, is effectively an enormous coordination problem faced
by literally hundreds of thousands, if not indeed millions, of dispersed interested
parties. Each of these parties acting individually has good reason to wait for the others to act, and so the group as a whole fails to act. Further, even such parties as might
nevertheless wish to act would be unable to find one another to act. Contract rigidities
and incentives that trustees, servicers and second lien holders face drive the final
nails in the coffin.
There is no one as yet who has proved willing and able to act in a manner
that benefits all of these fragmented parties in interest. No federal programs or instrumentalities are properly equipped, let alone carefully aimed, at the core problem.

ers. This would be so even were modifications to underlying loans demonstrably to improve expected value. For the TIA’s requirements are categorical, while actually securing the categorically required express unanimity among thousands or millions of RMBS holders worldwide is so
highly improbable as to amount to impossibility. While it is not clear to what extent, if any, the
TIA currently figures into the thinking of servicers and trust administrators intrigued by the
prospect of value-salvaging mortgage modifications, given the many more conspicuous factors
already cited that serve to dissuade modification, it surely could present an obstacle were
those other obstacles to be removed. See Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3.
This of course affords yet more reason to act pursuant to the Plan elaborated next, in Part III of
this Article.
95 See Hockett, Six Years On and Still Counting, supra note 3, for a complete catalogue
of all impediments, as well as “flowchart”-form tracing of their multiple mutual interactions.
See also Alpert, Hockett, & Roubini, The Way Forward, supra note 22.
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States and Municipalities as Requisite Collective Agents

Enter the one instrumentality that has not been considered. We refer to the
states and their municipalities—townships, cities, counties, and kindred units of local
government. By acting in the name of its residents, their safety and wellbeing, and its
own economic necessity—as well as in a manner that collaterally benefits all dispersed creditors who would rather be paid than foreclose—the American municipality is ideally positioned to solve that still worsening, value-destructive coordination
problem we face in our mortgage markets. For the problem itself is essentially, in its
first instance, local in character.
It is a real estate crisis we are living with. And it has been all along. That
means it is a local crisis before it is a national one. Main Street’s woes are the ultimate
source both of Wall Street’s and of the wider economy’s woes.
It is cities that must watch their residents being evicted, their homes being
emptied, their houses deteriorating, their property values plummeting, their tax bases dwindling, their services retrenching, their crime levels spiking, and so on. But
they don’t have to lie back and watch. They can act, and act now. They exist to address problems like these. Protecting the citizenry and heading off blight is what
municipal eminent domain authority is for. It’s why we have it. And it’s why municipalities, rather than states directly or the federal government, are those entities that
most often employ it.
The Plan grows from this simple fact. It is accordingly for municipalities, or
joint powers authorities (JPAs), that they or their states establish to enable coordination among multiple municipalities, to discharge their legally appointed function by
customary, legally familiar means. And it is for them to do so in partnership with
private investors who effectively render the Plan publicly costless—just as we’ve
done since the earliest days of our republic in carrying out and financing local projects.
Here is how it works. We begin schematically, then steadily fill in detail.
B.

The Plan’s Basic Structure

For purposes of exposition we shall again assume a particular municipality.
Again that will be the California county of San Bernardino, or a Joint Powers Authority (“Authority”) that San Bernardino or California establishes to facilitate collaboration among multiple municipalities. Now, in partnership with investors – including
current MBS holders – who entrust it with funds, and employing its traditional eminent domain power, the County or Authority will purchase, at fair market value,
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temporary possession of carefully selected underwater mortgage loans and liens on
properties located within its jurisdiction—to facilitate refinance of the same.96
Once it has purchased possession, the County or Authority will work directly with each willing mortgagor within its jurisdiction to accept a “short”—that is,
discounted—repayment of that mortgagor’s obligations. It will do so in an amount
corresponding to the level at which the mortgagor can obtain new financing in the
current mortgage loan market. The County or Authority will receive the discounted
repayment in the form of proceeds from new mortgage loans made to the mortgagors and conveyed to the same trusts as collect private investor funds. These proceeds
the trust will in turn convey to participating private investors as repayment in kind
of the moneys that the investors lend the municipality upfront to finance the condemnation awards.
As mentioned, municipalities or authorities, financed by private investors,
will pay just compensation to current loan and lien holders in purchasing the select
loans and liens, as required by both state and federal law.97 Applicable California
law, which defines the eminent domain authority somewhat more narrowly than
96 For reminder of why San Bernardino, California makes for an illustrative case
study, please see supra, note 54 and accompanying text. We say that possession of the purchased mortgages is, for the most part, “temporary” in two senses. First, the purchased mortgage note obligations and attendant mortgages securing them are discharged and extinguished upon repayment. Second, most of the new loans and attendant mortgages that replace
the antecedent ones are conveyed to new trusts that become the new mortgagees. The municipalities, in other words, do not simply become permanent state-level counterparts to the GSEs.
A partial exception to the general case here is the case of any borrower who might ultimately
prove non-refinancable, in whose case the municipality or joint powers authority will sell the
loan on the whole loan market in states that permit this, while holding them in states that do
not. (California permits its municipalities such sales, Florida and Nevada at present do not.)
Investors collaborating with the municipality or joint powers authority bear the risk in all cases, which, for reasons elaborated throughout this Article, is significantly lower than is the risk
of widespread default and attendant value loss in connection with non-refinanced underwater
mortgages. The bases on which mortgages are selected for acquisition is more fully infra. The
short-playing version is that the first selected mortgagors must be current on their obligations
– hence good credit risks – and owe on significantly underwater mortgage obligations – hence
strapped by severe post-bubble conditions that they had no more reason than did lenders to
anticipate. Some communities might of course subsequently select mortgages pursuant to
broader criteria, as determined per their own legislative judgment. The Plan is, in other words,
sufficiently adaptable as to be fine-tuned from community to community in manners responsive to those communities’ particular needs. It should also be noted, if only in passing, that
most mortgages securing real property debts in our sample state of California are actually
“deeds of trust.” For present purposes, however – or for most any other purpose, for that matter – no practical difference is introduced by this distinction. See generally 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW: SECURITY TRANSACTIONS IN REAL PROPERTY, § 5 at 795 (10th ed. 2005).
97 “Fair market value,” which is California’s legally mandated understanding of just
compensation, might even exceed current market value in view of the ongoing and still selfworsening slump whose structural dynamics we have characterized above in Parts I and II.
This is one sense in which creditors themselves benefit by the Plan. See infra, notes 101-104,
and associated text for more on this matter. See also, infra Part IV.
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does the U.S. Constitution, pegs just compensation at what it terms “fair market value.” This it defines as a price apt to be reached by counterparties bargaining at arm’s
length under orderly market conditions.98
Municipalities or authorities acting on the Plan in California and counterpart
states might accordingly sometimes be paying more for the affected loans and liens
even than many private market participants themselves would now value them, under those still self-worsening market conditions outlined and quantified above
throughout Parts I and II. For these, recall, are conditions that, again for the reasons
elaborated in Parts II, bear no inherent tendency to change. Indeed they will continue
to worsen unless and until municipalities or joint powers authorities act per the Plan
we elaborate.99
It is precisely this fact—the fact that concerted action taken by the municipalities will, in solving the collective action and other structural problems that underwrite all of the ongoing ill health that we find in our mortgage markets—which accounts for private market participants’ willingness to finance the condemnations in
the manner next to be described. More, then, on that.
Municipalities or authorities acting on the Plan will pay for the mortgageassociated loans and liens of which they take legal possession with funds supplied by
the aforementioned private sector investors.100 Among these investors—which again,
notably, may include current loan and lien holders themselves, indirectly through
MBS101—will be one or more of the following: public and private pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and other investment firms.102
98 Cal. Civ. PROC. §§ 1263.310 & 1263.320(a). See infra Part IV for full text. Fair market
value would accordingly be higher for, say, a property just outside the zone of danger deemed
by authorities to surround Three Mile Island than could likely be had in the actual market for
such properties post-1978. By the same token it would be lower for, say, the last property sold
on the outskirts of territory recently announced to be slated for a new Vandenberg Air Force
Base than the actual market assigned to such property immediately following that 1950s-era
announcement. See infra Part IV.
99 Precisely because current conditions are rooted in coordination impasse as elaborated in Parts I and II. See in particular, in this connection, the statistics elaborated in Part II.
100 While the private sector investors will initially be acting as lenders of a joint powers authority or other off-balance-sheet entity established by the municipalities to receive the
condemned mortgage loans/liens, the transaction constitutes part of a forward purchase by
those investors of new mortgage securities that will come forth pursuant to the Plan’s execution. There is a sense here in which investors are effectively partnering with municipalities.
They are doing so pursuant to an arrangement in which the municipalities now act in the
name of all interested parties, per the terms of Parts I and II above, as that one collective agent
which is able to solve the collective action problems that all mortgage securities investors and
their obligors currently face when contemplating the desirable prospect of value-salvaging
loan restructuring.
101 This should not be surprising, given the rootedness of current marketundervaluation of these institutions’ mortgage loan and lien holdings in impassible coordination problems that they face and the municipalities now solves in their name.
102 See supra note 100; see also, infra Part IV.
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Investors apt to be attracted by the Plan include, in particular, those who
might wish to replace presently troubled and default-prone mortgage loans with safer assets, either in their own portfolios or in the portfolios they manage for others in
fiduciary capacities. As suggested above in Part II, that might include mean even the
GSEs—Fannie and Freddie, who by participating in the Plan can maximize portfolio
value and facilitate principal write downs in the public interest without having to
make hefty HAMP PRA “incentive” payments to servicers.
In sum, the plan as schematically rendered looks like this (single-headed arrows should be followed counterclockwise beginning at upper left; double-headed
arrow symbolizes identity or overlap as between linked classes):
Overlapping Membership

In-

MBS
$

$

ld
Bad Loans

Good Loans

Trusts

Cities
$

Trusts

$

$

Investors, including current MBS holders, convey funds to trusts or accounts
organized and maintained by municipalities. The municipalities then use the funds
to purchase deeply underwater loans with high default risk from current PLS trusts,
which later continue to pay out to their bondholder beneficiaries. The municipalities
then work with homeowners to replace the underwater loans, on which they owe
and which the municipalities now hold, with new, above-water loans. Once that is
done, the new loans are conveyed to the first-mentioned trusts, which convey resultant funds to the first-mentioned investors just as the mentioned PLS trusts do to their
own beneficiaries. That’s the plan in broad outline.
Of course, as the words “schematic” and “broad outline” suggest, this is but
the bare structure of the plan. Much more is required—flesh added to the bare bones,
so to speak—to render such a plan operational. There are, for example, the matters of
(a) selecting and preliminarily valuing the appropriate underwater loans, (b) approaching and securing the involvement of the investors, (c) commencing and conducting the legal proceedings pursuant to which eminent domain authority is actually exercises, (d) actually restructuring and perhaps re-securitizing the loans once they
are purchased, (e) working with homeowners in connection with the foregoing, and
(f) ultimately compensating the investors once the process is completed, among other
things. And significant legal, financial, and counseling expertise are required if all of
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these functions are to be discharged effectively. Yet this can, all of it, be had and be
done. Now to the condemnation process itself.
C.

The Loan Condemnation Process

At the commencement of planned condemnation proceedings, the municipalities or authorities will deposit the mentioned investor-supplied funds, as required by states’ eminent domain statutes, in state-administered trusts or escrow accounts maintained for the purpose. The deposited amount in each particular case
will, again as mandated by law, be set equal to the probable just compensation ultimately to be paid for the mortgage loans and liens that the given municipality condemns.
Under “quick take” eminent domain procedures such as those that apply in
California and many other states, probable just compensation is determined up front
via municipality-procured appraisals. Funds then are deposited into the aforementioned accounts at the time that the condemnation motions are filed. Once final compensation amounts have been subsequently determined by loan and lien holders and
the condemning municipality—either with or without court assistance—any overage
left in the escrow accounts will be equitably distributed among loan and lien holders,
donated to qualified housing charities through a program administered by a respected national eleemosynary foundation, or both.
Once underwater loans are acquired, each municipality or authority will, in
cooperation with the consortium of investors who supply the upfront funding, ultimately accept discounted repayment of the loans from qualifying mortgagors who
have opted in to the Plan. Repayment of the acquired loans is effected by reunderwriting and refinancing participating mortgagors pursuant to criteria commonly employed by ordinary market lenders and guarantors like the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA). This way the Plan ensures that the new loans are particularly
safe and sound.103
Additional substantive eligibility criteria, at least in the Plan’s early stages
when erring on the side of caution is prudent, are as follows.
D.

Early Loan Selection Criteria

First, the Plan will apply only to single family, owner-occupied residences
within each municipality’s jurisdiction. Second, all existing qualifying first lien mort103 Departure from traditional, and historically highly successful, FHA underwriting
criteria was a hallmark, of course, of the notorious nonprime loans that grew popular during
the final phase of the bubble. See Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, supra note 11; see also
MORRIS, supra note 44.
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gage loans will have loan to value ratios (LTVs) greater than 100%. Third, the aggregate fair market value of loans or liens secured by any qualifying home should total
85% or less of the value of the home itself, as determined by quantitative valuation
methods developed by the municipalities’ in partnership with qualified mortgage finance professionals. Finally, the value of qualifying homes will not exceed 105.3% of
FHA approved loan amounts—thus permitting a 95% new loan to value ratio. As it
happens, our sample state of California is the situs of just under 1.5 million mortgage
loans meeting these categorical criteria.
Other states and municipalities will of course be the situs of different numbers of mortgage loans meeting the criteria, and all states over time will presumably
adjust the criteria in keeping with their own local needs and legislative judgments.
This responsiveness to specific state and local conditions is indeed one of the particular strengths of the Plan. Rather than requiring one or two entities with national
scope to deal in “one size fits all” terms with thousands of servicers, per the concerns
expressed by FHFA as noted above in note 92, the Plan enables localities flexibly to
tailor criteria to varying local circumstances, as well as to deal with much smaller
numbers of trustees and servicers, more on which momentarily.
Along with the categorical criteria just elaborated, the Plan contemplates
possible use of several additional, somewhat more open-ended substantive criteria in
“prioritizing” mortgagors. First, priority will likely be given at first to those homeowners who appear, on the basis of existing loan level information including credit
history and the mortgaged property itself, to qualify for refinancing into new FHA
first mortgage loans of 95% LTV. That is again an “err on the side of caution” principle, based on the high success rates of FHA-conforming mortgage loans over the past
80 years.
Second, priority will preliminarily be given to first mortgage loans held in
private label securitization trusts (PLSTs), as well as associated second mortgage
liens. This is in order to minimize the number of parties with whom municipalities
must negotiate in purchasing qualifying loans and repayment rights—thereby preventing replication of the coordination challenges that necessitate local action in the
first place.
Once the Plan is fully underway, municipalities or authorities will presumably conduct further iterations in which non-PLST-held loans likewise are purchased
and refinanced in cooperation with obligors. It appears that California is the situs of
approximately 565,700 mortgage loans—38% of all underwater such loans—held in
PLSTs.
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Benefits of the Plan

A particular municipality such as San Bernardino County might reasonably
anticipate that some 6,000 homeowners, with mortgage loans held by some 4,000
PLSTs managed by merely twelve trustees, will complete the opt-in process during
the first phase of its use of the Plan after acquiring the qualifying mortgage loans.
These loans might just as reasonably be expected to possess an average fair market
value, as this term of art is defined under California law, of somewhere in the neighborhood of $150,000.104 The County, in turn, might determine to err on the side of
caution by placing, say, $1 billion into the aforementioned state-managed trust or escrow account on behalf of the PLSTs from which it will purchase the loans.
The County or Authority in most cases also will treat together all loans in
connection with which any specific trustee acts on behalf of some PLST presently
holding the loans. That again enables a county like San Bernardino effectively to
eliminate the coordination challenges that have blocked loan restructuring thus far
among its first 6,000 qualifying residents and many thousands—if not millions—of
dispersed PLST bondholders. For it will now be negotiating with a mere twelve trustees. The new refinanced loans that replace the old, underwater loans will then ultimately be grouped together again, with the partnering institutions that finance the
municipalities’ purchases holding the resultant bonds.
In effect, each municipality or authority that adopts and acts on the Plan will
be taking possession of mortgage loans to resolve and refinance them—in short, to
negotiate EV-maximizing principal write downs that lenders and borrowers alike
wish to see but cannot separately negotiate in light of the impediments catalogued in
Part II. In so doing it will also be accepting discounted repayment in the form of proceeds from new mortgage loans. These latter in turn are originated specifically for
the purpose of conveyance to participating private investors, as repayment in kind of
the moneys that the investors lend the municipality upfront to finance the condemnation award.105
In operating pursuant to the Plan, each municipality will preserve neighborhood integrity, property values, and the revenue base from which it funds services. It
will keep its own residents in their own homes—still owning and paying on them rather than falling into default and foreclosure that harms lenders nearly as much as it
does borrowers. It will also enable residents to get out from under the debt overhang
104 See infra note 135 and accompanying text for more on the technical meaning of
“fair market value” under California law. The dollar figure is from DQ NEWS.
105 As noted supra note 98, there might be a small cohort of mortgage loans that, for
one reason or other, ultimately prove not to be refinancable. Such loans of this description as
might emerge will be sold by municipalities in the “whole loan” market for cash, which cash
will then also be returned to investors.
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that for six years and counting has increasingly imperiled not only them, but their
lenders, their neighbors, and the state, local, and national economies to boot.
In short, the Municipal Plan is an efficient and Solomonic solution that treats
everyone fairly and protects countless third parties against the immensely destructive spillover consequences of mass foreclosure as well. There has never been a more
fitting use of the states’ traditional eminent domain authority.
IV. The Plan’s Constitutional Basis and Legal-Procedural Details
The Municipal Plan makes essential use of the states’ and their instrumentalities’ traditional eminent domain authority. It will accordingly be helpful now to lay
out the broad contours of this authority and its applicability to the purposes pursuant to which the Plan employs it. That way we lay out the structure of this, legal
“layer” of the Plan just as Part III has laid out the structure of its financial “layer.”106
The two layers together constitute the entirety of the Plan much as a contour
map captures a salient entirety of a geographical region. In an important sense, however, the legal layer is more “fundamental.” For the states can act only in keeping
with their legal authority, Plan or no Plan. On, then, to this authority on the basis of
which the Plan envisages states and municipalities acting.
A.

Eminent Domain Authority: Fundamentals

The eminent domain authority is of longstanding in both the civil and common law traditions. Even as early an articulation of the authority as that found in
Grotius’s De Jure Belli et Pacis reads strikingly like contemporary articulations.107 The
guiding idea behind eminent domain might be better conveyed in contemporary
terms by substituting the now more familiar “preeminent” and “dominion” for the
more archaic “eminent” and “domain.”

106 Because this Article is meant to be intelligible to non-lawyers, there is more in the
way of background explanation, and somewhat less in the way of luxuriant citation to authority, here than there would in an appellate brief of the sort that the author is accustomed to penning. All constitutional, statutory, and case-legal authority relied upon in this Part, however,
still is cited in full. There simply will not be citations for literally every sentence as is generally
the case in briefs filed in court.
107 “The property of subjects is under the eminent domain of the state, so that the
state or he who acts for it may use and even alienate and destroy such property, not only in the
case of extreme necessity, . . . but for ends of public utility, to which ends . . . private ends
should give way. But it is to be added that when this is done the state is bound to make good
the loss to those who lose their property.” HUIG DE GROOT (“Grotius”), DE JURE BELLI ET PACIS
(“The Law of War and Peace”) (1625), available at http://www.lonang.com/
exlibris/grotius/index.html. For more on Grotius, see ROBERT HOCKETT, THE LITTLE BOOK OF
BIG IDEAS: LAW (2009). Contemporary articulations of the eminent domain authority to follow.
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The gist of “preeminent dominion” is that any sovereign authority—the nation, a state, or some other fundamental unit of government—so long as it acts on
behalf and in the name of the people, holds a dominion over property within its jurisdiction that is implicitly prior to that of any particular individual. This it may sparingly exercise as against any subordinate private dominion over the property in
question, when and only when necessary for the good of all, provided it pay just
compensation when so doing.
Because this authority is as plenary as the sovereign’s jurisdiction itself and
accordingly operates, like the relevant unit of government itself, in the name of the
sovereign public or people as a whole, it is applicable to all forms of property—real
or personal, tangible or intangible, integral or fragmentary. A unit of government
that can exercise personal jurisdiction and thereby “haul you into court,” try you,
condemn you, imprison or even execute you, unsurprisingly, can exercise in rem jurisdiction over and “condemn” your inanimate possessions as well. The question is
not whether, but how and within what limitations.
The only inherent limitations on the eminent domain authority are already
implicit in the characterizations just given. As it is ultimately the public’s or people’s
authority—in the U.S., the authority of that “We, the people,” who speak in the Preamble to the Constitution—it can only be exercised for a purpose of the people: a public purpose. And, presumably because a guiding principle of that social contractarian
legal and political ideal that has been part of the American ethos since at least the
time of that favorite of the American Founders, John Locke, has been that citizens
should not be made worse off for being members of a polity than they would have
been in a “state of nature,” the public holds itself bound also to compensate any of its
members against whose privately held property it exercises its eminent domain authority.
B.

Eminent Domain Authority and “Our Federalism”

These are the apposite “first principles,” which antedate the American
founding and find their way into American law via the British common law that we
adopted, then adapted, from the colonial era on down to the present. An additional
wrinkle is introduced in the American case, however, by the federal system of government that we also embraced with our Constitution. Pursuant to the “dual sovereignty” exercised by state and federal governments alike under our system, both sites
of sovereignty hold powers of eminent domain. All that differs between them, in essence, is the identity of the relevant “public”—or, in the terms of Parts I through III
above, the relevant “collectivity”—on whose behalf each government acts as collective agent.
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To remain with our earlier, not quite randomly selected example, then, California’s state government exercises its eminent domain authority in the name of and
on behalf of Californians as residents of California. The federal government exercises
its counterpart eminent domain authority in the name of and on behalf of Americans
as citizens of the U.S. Of course this means also that California’s exercise of its eminent domain authority will be conducted pursuant to a “public purpose” understood
in reference to the public of California—the Californian citizenry—while the federal
government’s such exercises are symmetrically taken for purposes of the full U.S. citizenry.
Exercises of the eminent domain or any other authority by these distinct sovereigns may collaterally benefit other “publics” that they do not represent, of course.
U.S. clean air standards presumably benefit many outside of the U.S. just as surely as
U.S. carbon emissions might induce acid rain elsewhere, for example. But the exercise of authority must always be capable of being justified by reference to that public
which actually authorizes the government in question to act in its name.
It is also the case, of course, that citizens of California are likewise citizens of
the U.S., meaning that there is overlap among the “publics” who are implicated by
the U.S. and Californian “public purposes” for which U.S. and Californian eminent
domain authority might be exercised. How then are those purposes distinguished?
Here it is helpful to recur once again to the notion of a collective action problem of
the sort that figures prominently in Parts I through III. In essence, our constitutional
arrangement is such as to observe principles of what in other parts of the world are
called “subsidiarity.”
The basic subsidiarian idea, which the U.S. honors under several distinct
terminologies—one such of course being “federalism”—boils down to this: Where
satisfaction of some particular interest requires addressing a collective action challenge that afflicts some group of n persons and no more, in general the smallest unit
of government with jurisdiction over those n persons should be charged with satisfying that interest.
The interest of national defense, for example, and the collective-actionredolent “free rider problem” that imperils it, is inherently national in scope in the
sense that national forces are needed and all national citizens must be taxed to finance them, even when there are or have been state National Guard units or militias.
The interest of policing a neighborhood, by contrast, and the free rider problem that
imperils it, is straightforwardly local and can be handled and tax-financed accordingly.108
108 Unless of course there is a national interest in rough equality of service quality nationwide, which as an inherently national interest would in some circumstances bring federal
subsidies to underserved localities, financed via federal revenues. Counterpart remarks hold
for education, water quality, etc., many of which implicate either the Equal Protection Clause
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In between these two “highest” and “lowest” levels of government, national
subdivisions like states, or coalitions thereof, will be best suited to handling certain
matters that affect multiple cities or townships within their jurisdictions while not
affecting any outside of them—matters concerning the management of certain shared
rivers or lakes, for example.
An important feature of the American rendition of subsidiarity for present
purposes is its vesting jurisdiction over matters of real property, trust and estates,
contract, and commercial law—the stuff of housing, home-ownership, real estate and
mortgage finance—almost exclusively with the states.109 Legal-doctrinally speaking,
that vesting takes the form of states’ reservation, via the Constitution’s 10th Amendment, of what is known as a residual “police power” over matters not expressly or
impliedly placed under immediate or optional federal jurisdiction by other provisions of the Constitution.
“Police” here, importantly, is to be understood in the sense of “policy” rather
than “constable,” though the term definitely embraces the notion of states’ roles as
protectors of their citizens, and in that sense as regulators of activities that can harm
or pose significant risks to them. This is, again, a residual plenary authority, understood as that fundamental baseline from which the federal constitution’s so-called
“enumerated powers” constitute only discrete, limited, conditional exceptions.
States’ or their instrumentalities’ roles as collective agents in this context,
then, as suggested in introducing this Part above, can be viewed as occupying a
“contract-and-property-legal layer” over which their roles as collective agents as
suggested in Part III serve as a “mortgage-financial overlay.” Fundamentally, state
governments exercise their police powers, of which the eminent domain power is but
one, both in the name of and on behalf of the collectivity of their citizens—most of
whom are home owners and neighborhood dwellers, and many of whom are borrowers and lenders.
Collaterally, though, in some cases of so doing they will also be assisting
their citizens in the resolution of collective action problems that these citizens face in
of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or political and hence legislative values that
find partial expression therein. Of course where schooling is concerned, the Clause itself has
been held to require very little, alas. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973).
109 Hence all states have their own property codes, and nearly all have their own versions of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Article 2 of which covers commercial contracts,
Article 9 of which covers secured transactions including mortgage-secured such transactions,
and Article 3 of which covers negotiable instruments including promissory notes of the sort
mortgagors convey to mortgagees. Significantly, there is no “national” property code, nor is
there any national commercial code, the “uniformity” of the UCC signifying an aspiration of
the drafters and Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) that states voluntarily harmonize precisely
because there is no federally imposed uniformity. See generally Hockett, Six Years On and Still
Counting, supra note 3.
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conjunction with out-of-state others to whom they relate in contract, so as effectively
to benefit all. This is, of course, what we have found in connection with the Municipal Plan elaborated above in Part III.
In the just mentioned interstate contracting connection it of course bears noting that it is a commonplace of the American constitutional order that jurisdiction
over matters concerning inherently or undeniably interstate commerce can be exercised by the federal legislature. It is not quite as commonplace, but at least is notorious to many a law student past the first year, that some such matters are thought to
be so essentially interstate in character as to count as implicitly required to be kept
uniform across states even when Congress has not affirmatively acted so to require.110
But what is most striking against this backdrop is how much our constitutional order nevertheless reserves to the states—and, in particular, how matters of
contract, commercial, and especially property law continue to be almost entirely matters of state law under that order. We really do remain, in a significant sense, a sort of
“compact of states.”
One more wrinkle important to note in connection with both our federated
form of subsidiarity and the place of the eminent domain authority in American law
comes with the role of municipalities in our system. Because the federal Constitution
was historically a compact entered into by what were viewed as thirteen antecedently sovereign states, states are effectively viewed as being among the original delegators of authority in our system.
The federal government being a creature of “the People” independently of
the states, as suggested by the Preamble to the Constitution, finds expression, legislatively speaking, in the House of Representatives, wherein states are represented in
proportion to their populations. But the federal government’s being, also and simultaneously a creature of the states, also finds expression in our national legislature—in
this case via the Senate, wherein each state is represented, as a state, by the same
number of Senators.

110 This is the domain of the so-called “dormant,” or “implicit” Commerce Clause,
essentially interpreted as a prohibition on protectionism on the part of states of firms located
within them at the expense of competing firms located in other states – a sort of GATT or WTO
of the states. Notorious examples include South Carolina’s once prohibiting delivery trucks of
a particular size from using its highways, widely recognized as a means of protecting local
producers against imports from neighboring-state competitors. People who fret over “judicial
activism” are among those who most loathe the notion of a “dormant” Commerce Clause. If
it’s asleep, let it lie until Congress expressly awakens it, they in effect complain.
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Eminent Domain and State-Local Authority-Sharing

If states share their delegation of authority with “the people” of the nation as
a whole where federal governance is concerned, however, they are the sole delegators
of authority to their own municipalities. They are not viewed under our law as
“compacts” or “federations” of their cities and towns, in other words, as the federal
government is viewed as a federation of “united” “states.” Instead the term that the
law uses in this context is “creatures.” Municipalities are “creatures of state law,”
just as are trusts, corporations, and other legal entities. Indeed, in most states, municipalities are in fact legally known as “municipal corporations,” from whence derives
the notion of “incorporating” a town.
The significance of this relation between state and municipality for present
purposes is twofold. First, even when employed by municipalities, as it typically is
pursuant to state delegation under “home rule” or cognate statutes, the eminent domain authority is state authority. In that sense it is located at the very core of our federal system of government—a species of authority that belongs to the states quite as
fully, if not indeed more so, as it does to the federal government.
Second, in delegating the eminent domain power to their municipalities as
states generally do, they are delegating it to entities that are in a certain sense “on a
level” with other organized entities created under state law—even private such entities like trusts. Hence it is unsurprising that municipalities often work in partnership
with other entities in pursuing public purposes through use of the eminent domain
power—as the Municipal Plan itself envisages. This has been the way of eminent
domain since the earliest days of our republic.
That takes us on to the Municipal Plan in particular and its status as a familiar and altogether orthodox exercise of the eminent domain power. For expository
purposes noted above in note 54 and the text that accompanies it, we shall once again
assume use of the Plan in a particular state: California. For the same purposes we
shall also assume the same county as before: San Bernardino.
D.

Eminent Domain in a Sample State and Municipality: San Bernardino

Taking some other state or municipality for our illustrative example might
affect the analysis we shall now undertake at the margin, but only at the margin.
That is because all of the states’ eminent domain regimes are quite similar. All one
would have to do to apply the forthcoming analysis to a different state and municipality would be to cite distinct state constitutional, statutory, and municipal provisions as well as judicial constructions thereof, and then accommodate such minor
terminological wrinkles as these variations would introduce.
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Back to California and San Bernardino, then, for purposes of the present hypothetical legal analysis. The Municipal Plan’s use of eminent domain authority will
be subject both to the federal and to the state constitutions—first the latter, then the
former as a final check on the latter. The California provision on point is article I, Section 19 of the state’s Constitution. Subsection (a) thereof reads:
Private property may be taken or damaged for a public
use and only when just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless
waived, has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner. The
Legislature may provide for possession by the condemnor following
commencement of eminent domain proceedings upon deposit in court and
prompt release to the owner of money determined by the court to be
the probable amount of just compensation.111
The “public use” and “just compensation” limitations are of course common—so much so that the introductory discussion above, it might have been noted,
employed the same terminology without reference to any particular state or federal
constitutional provision. The referenced requirement to place potential condemnation award moneys—the prospective just compensation—in escrow is likewise common, and is of course one reason for provision to do so in the Municipal Plan as laid
out above in Part III.
The applicable federal constitutional provision on point, the “Takings
Clause” of the Fifth Amendment, is no more restrictive than the California provision.112 Indeed if anything, it is less so. For the U.S. Supreme Court notoriously has
interpreted the provision to allow government condemnation of private residences
for purposes of conveying them to private parties in the name of economic development.113 California, by contrast, is more arguably solicitous of homeowners’ interest
in remaining in their homes. Hence it purports to forbid Kelo-style taking in subsection (b) of the aforecited Section 19.114 In general, however, the U.S. and California
provisions are sufficiently in agreement as to underwrite California courts’ regularly
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (a).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). What is perhaps most noteworthy about this clause is the fact that it
presupposes that private property regularly is, and accordingly may, be taken for public use,
with the clause purporting to restrict the common practice only by reiterating that just compensation is to be paid.
113 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
114 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (b) (“The State and local governments are prohibited from
acquiring by eminent domain an owner-occupied residence for the purpose of conveying it to
a private person.”). It should perhaps be noted, if only in passing, that subparts (c) and (d) go
on to limit subpart (b) itself somewhat, in the form of familiar exceptions for public health or
public works projects.
111
112
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citing to both state and federal decisions in cases involving the exercise of eminent
domain in the state.115
E.

Forms of Property Subject to Eminent Domain Authority

Next, as noted above, eminent domain authority is exercisable over all forms
of property—real or personal, simple or fragmentary, tangible or intangible. That,
again, is the case everywhere that eminent domain authority is recognized, be it in
civil or common law jurisdictions.
Under the federal rendition of this authority, for its part, the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Courts of Appeals have regularly held that the authority extends, for
example, to contract rights,116 insurance policies,117 outstanding shares of stock,118
businesses as going-concerns,119 hunting rights,120 rights of way,121 and all manner of
additional intangible. U.S. states follow the same longstanding common law tradition
as does federal law in this connection.122 California’s Supreme Court, for example,
long has explicitly recognized that “[the state’s] eminent domain law authorizes the
taking of intangible property.”123
In view of the law’s drawing of no distinctions between kinds of property
that can be condemned in eminent domain proceedings, it should come as no surprise that liens in particular, as merely one form of contractual obligation among
many, all of which can be condemned, are themselves regularly condemned.124
Among those liens are, mortgage loans and liens, as the U.S. Supreme Court and other state courts have recognized.125 Hence, again, the explicit recognition by the Cali115 See Cnty. of Ventura v. Channel Islands Marina, Inc., 159 Cal. App. 4th 615 (2008).
Given the post-Kelo date of this cited decision, on the one hand, and the exceptions to subsection-subpart (b) of the subsection 19 of the California Constitution’s article I cited in the previous note, there might be some reason to question whether California takings law is indeed
more restrictive than federal takings law under Kelo, as I suggested above.
116 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Company Co. of N.Y. v. N.J., 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
117 See, e.g., Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 577-79 (1934).
118 See, e.g., Offield v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906).
119 See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. U.S., 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
120 See, e.g., Swan Lake Hunting Club v. U.S., 381 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
121 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 390 (1912).
122 See, e.g., New York, N.H.HHNew HavenH & H.R.Hartford R.R. Co. v. Offield, 59
A. 510 (Conn. 1904) (Connecticut, condemning stock); Spencer v. Seaboard Air Line Co., 49 S.E.
96 (N.C. 1904).
123 City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d 60, 68 (2008) (condemning a sports
franchise).
124 See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Wash. Legal Fund, 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (accrued
interest on account funds); Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (materialman’s lien); and the
iconic Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
125 See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 602 (1935) (“If
the public interest requires . . . the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent
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fornia Supreme Court, too, that “[n]o constitutional restriction, federal or state, purports to limit the nature of the property that may be taken by eminent domain.”126
The only complication at all that is introduced into eminent domain analysis
by intangible property has to do with the effect that intangibility has on state courts’
jurisdiction, since intangibles cannot be literally, spatially “located.” The law has
long been aware of the fact that intangibles are not tangible and accordingly not spatially located, however, and its doctrines have responded accordingly.
Because the doctrines of due process, in personam, in rem, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction through which it does so are particularly complex and technical both in themselves and in their interactions, though, it will be well to forgo
fuller technical treatment.127 For present purposes, it will suffice to observe that in
general, courts find the situs of a debt instrument to be in the domiciliary state of the
debtor,128 and the situs of real estate mortgage debt in particular to be the state in
which the mortgaged property is itself located.129
It will be noted that where the mortgage debtor is domiciled in the mortgaged home itself, as is in fact required to qualify for loan modification under the
Municipal Plan as elaborated in Part III, both of the aforementioned grounds of state
jurisdiction converge. This entails that the state enjoys both in rem jurisdiction over
the debt and the property securing it, and due process-consistent in personam jurisdiction over the creditor/mortgagee, both of these ultimately in virtue of the territorial
jurisdiction it has over the space in which the mortgagee and her home are respectively domiciled and located. Subject matter jurisdiction, for its part, is here a matter
of traditional state authority delegated to municipalities, more on which presently.
Federal and state constitutional authority to exercise the eminent domain
power over intangibles like mortgage notes as contemplated by the Municipal Plan,
then, is secure. The same holds of power to transfer acquired such property—
domain.”); W. Fertilizer & Cordage Co. v. City of Alliance, 504 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Neb. 1993)
(holding that “a mortgagee’s lien on real estate is an interest that may be subjected to a taking
for a public purpose and, therefore, may be the subject of an eminent domain proceeding”).
126 Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d at 67.
127 The author taught Civil Procedure I and Civil Procedure II in the legal academy
during his final year as a doctoral student. The first of those courses is in its entirety devoted to
the subject of jurisdiction, which involves not only codes of procedure, but such constitutional
interests as due process. He trusts that the reader would rather not have this full semester
course be summarized within the present text.
128 See, e.g., the old chestnuts, beloved of all professors and students of Civil Procedure, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905); Chicago, Rock Isl. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Sturm, 174 U.S.
710 (1899). In California in particular, see Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal.3d 461 (1972).
129 Here the jurisdiction is mediated by the un-severable link between mortgage and
note. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1873) (“The note and mortgage are inseparable.”); and Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319, 327 (1891) (“The debt and security are inseparable;
the mortgage alone is not a subject of transfer.”). For more on this matter, and its consequent
wedding of inherently state-centric property and commercial law, see Hockett, Six Years On
and Still Counting, supra note 3.
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tangible as well as intangible—to private entities. In the case of federal law, of course,
the latest and most oft-cited word on the matter is the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 Kelo
decision mentioned above. California, as also noted above, is sufficiently solicitous of
the interest of homeowners in staying in their homes as to limit condemnation of residences for purposes of transfer to private entities. That is of course good news for
the constitutionality of the Municipal Plan, a principal purpose of which is precisely
to prevent foreclosures, evictions, and expropriation of homeowners.
Also good news is the fact that California is as open as is the U.S. Supreme
Court to the transfer of condemned intangibles, as likewise contemplated in the Municipal Plan. The only restriction in this case is the earlier discussed public-purpose
requirement that is at the heart of the eminent domain power; to the precise contours
of which under U.S. and California law we shall turn, in due course. California’s authorization of the transfer of condemned intangibles is found in its Code of Civil Procedure,130 and is well recognized by the State’s Supreme Court.131
The next thing to note is that, as suggested by the citation just made to California’s Code of Civil Procedure, statutory law promulgated by state legislatures affords further guidance to use of the eminent domain authority. To keep with our
sample state—California—then, the applicable law is, as just effectively noted, found
in the State’s Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 1230.010 to 1273.050, known as the
state’s Eminent Domain Law.
This, for its part, first requires that express statutory authority authorize any
particular government instrumentality’s use of the eminent domain power.132 As for
the question of which such instrumentalities might do so, California conforms to the
general observations made above that (1) municipalities and joint powers authorities
themselves exercise these powers only insofar as states delegate the powers to them,
while (2) most states do in fact thus delegate them. Hence in California, municipalities and joint-powers authorities (1) exercise eminent domain authority “only when
expressly authorized by law,”133 while (2) they are in fact expressly authorized by law
to exercise this authority.134

130 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.120(b) (property condemnable “with the intent to
sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of [the same]. . .”).
131 Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d at 74 (“So long as adequate controls are imposed [to ensure transfer to private entity itself furthers public purpose], there is no reason why the ‘public
purpose’ which justifies a taking may not be so served and protected.”).
132 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.020 (“The power of eminent domain may be exercised
to acquire property for a particular use only by a person authorized by statute to exercise the
power of eminent domain to acquire such property for that use.”).
133 Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal.3d at 64 (citation omitted). See also CAL. CIV. PROC. §
1240.020 (power exercisable “only by a person authorized by statute to exercise [it]”).
134 See CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 37350.5.
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Just Compensation

As in other states, statutory guidance also further contours the determination
of what counts as “just compensation” in California—that which must, again under
both the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under
Article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, be paid those whose property is
condemned under the eminent domain authority. California’s Eminent Domain Law
provides that guidance in sections 1263.310 and 1263.320(a).
As mentioned above in Part III, the first section stipulates that “fair market
value” be paid for the property taken. Also as mentioned above, the second section
defines “fair market value” essentially as the highest price apt to be reached by willing counterparties bargaining under conditions of unforced sale.135
G.

Public Purpose

The final limitation upon the eminent domain authority about which a bit
more should be said is the “public purpose” requirement mentioned above with our
first, preliminary characterization of the authority. While the requirement has always
been implicit in the doctrine of eminent domain itself—since well before anyone
knew there would one day be a United States of America—the requirement finds
more specific expression, again, in specific provisions of federal and state law.
The applicable federal law is simply the Supreme Court’s elaboration of the
public-use requirement implicit in the aforementioned Takings Clause. The applicable state law comprises (1) Article I, section 19 of the state Constitution, (2) California
statutory provisions to be considered presently, and (3) state judicial constructions of
(1) and (2).
The basic grounding of state and municipal exercises of eminent domain authority amounts to a kind of combined subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdiction. It is the “police power” mentioned above in preliminarily characterizing the
doctrine of eminent domain generally. The U.S. Constitution’s 10th Amendment spe135 The statutory language reads thus: Fair market value is “the highest price on the
date of valuation that would be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and
able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing with the other with full
knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable and
available.” See also CAL. CIV. PROC. § 1263.320(a).Further guidance is provided in the form of a
stipulation that existing comparable markets can be used in ascertaining the mentioned counterfactual “would.” Absent some such comparable market, the Eminent Domain Law permits
determination of “fair market value” as determined by any method of valuation that is “just
and equitable.” See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1263.320(b). The discussion over Parts I through III
above, as well as that over Part IV below, would seem to have some bearing on what is just
and equitable here.
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cifically reserves this power to the states, and most of the states in turn delegate portions of this power to their municipalities along more or less subsidiarist lines as
elaborated above. California does this through its constitution’s article XI, Section 7,
which provides that “[a] county or city may make and enforce within its [territorial]
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict
with general laws.”
As the catch-all “other ordinances” suggests, the police power is very
broad—indeed, it is a “plenary authority to govern, subject only to the limitation that
[the municipalities exercising the power] exercise [it] within their territorial limits
and subordinate to state law.”136 Hence it permits municipalities authority “to enact
laws to promote public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”137
Presumably because (1) states and municipalities employ eminent domain
authority in exercising their police powers, while (2) these powers are themselves
very broad per the federal Constitution’s 10th Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court’s
construction of the eminent domain public purpose requirement is very deferential
to state and municipal legislative judgments of public purpose. The best known exemplar is again the Court’s widely discussed Kelo decision of 2005, in which the city
of New London, Connecticut’s condemnation of homes with relatively low market
value to make land available to private developers, was upheld. The proffered public
purpose in Kelo was economic development, which the city thought a likely collateral
benefit of the developers’ proposed facility. The Court for its part recognized the interest in economic development as a legitimate “public use” for purposes of the eminent domain authority.
Two other public purposes commonly recognized both by the Supreme
Court and all other courts in the United States are particularly apposite to the Municipal Plan. One is the long recognized public interest in reversing or preventing blight.
So venerable is this particular purpose that the City of New London itself appealed
to it in justifying the action mentioned above.
More common appeals to the blight reversal or prevention interests ground
themselves in actual abandoned or decaying homes, emptying neighborhoods, over136 Suter v. City of Lafayette, 57 Cal. App.4th 1109, 1118 (1997). Note that, structurally
and functionally speaking, the municipal/state relation is being characterized as analogous to
the state/federal relation. All that differs is the putative font of the authority in question, the
conceit in the state/federal case being that the states confer, along with “the People,” authority
upon the “higher level” federal government, while in the municipal/state case the conceit is
the reverse, with the state delegating authority to the “lower level” municipal governments.
As mentioned earlier in this Part One, however, the conceit is important, in that it imparts to
our federalism a tendency to treat states and their eminent domain as in a certain sense as or
more “fundamental” as/than the federal government and its eminent domain power. This
might account for the high degree of U.S. Supreme Court deference to state and local exercises
of eminent domain, as discussed presently.
137 Cmty. Mem’l Hosp. v. County Cnty. of Ventura, 50 Cal. App.4th 199, 206 (1996).
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growing lawns, crumbling roads and other infrastructure, and the like.138 Again, not
only reversal, but also prevention of developments such as these—both of which the
Municipal Plan by its terms aims to effect—counts as a public use par excellence for
purposes of justifying exercise of the eminent domain authority.139 Part V of this Article, to which we proceed presently, accordingly documents in detail the blight—
indeed, blight that is unprecedented in magnitude—now being wrought in multiple
U.S. municipalities by the ongoing mortgage foreclosure crisis.
The second public purpose routinely upheld as legitimate in challenges to
eminent domain exercise is the interest in eliminating dislocations in local housing
markets stemming from lienholders’, servicers’, and other parties’ unwillingness to
consent to short sales, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, and the like—as well as counterpart inability of mortgagors to sell at current market value or otherwise transfer
property in satisfaction of mortgage debt. Like the blight reversal and prevention interest, so is this one straightforwardly applicable to cases in which the Municipal
Plan will be pursued.
Here the best known U.S. Supreme Court decision is that handed down in
the case of Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,140 in which the Court found sufficient
public interest in the State of Hawaii’s wholesale condemnation of landlords’ ownership interests in real property in order to convey the property to tenants. The purpose of the condemnation and transfer was to “reduce the concentration of ownership of fees simple in the State,” which Hawaii had found “responsible for skewing
the State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public
tranquility and welfare.”141
Against the backdrop of Midkiff, it is difficult to imagine anyone’s finding the
Municipal Plan’s purposes anything other than fully public. The “landlords” in the
present case, after all, themselves overwhelmingly wish to write down principal but
are prevented from doing so by the collective action challenges catalogued in Part II.
They also, of course, hold property rights that are much more attenuated than those
of literal landlords, owning as they do only repayment rights and security interests.
Current securitized mortgagees likewise are immeasurably more “absentee”
than the most absent of literal landlords, the form of their “absence” in this case—
fragmented and scattered all over the world as they are, knowing only their bond instruments, not the properties that secure them—being precisely what stands in the
way of their coming together to write down principal as they would if they could.
And finally, as noted above they are free and invited in any event, per the terms of

138
139
140
141

Here the chestnut case is Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
See id.
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
Id. at 232.
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the Plan, to continue as owners by participating in the investment that funds the Municipal Plan itself, the funders of which become the ultimate resultant creditors.
So much for the federal construal of public purpose. As noted above, California’s understanding of “public use” tracks that of the federal courts.142 There is
accordingly little to add in respect of its case law on point. It is worth noting, however, that the State’s Eminent Domain Law (which we shall now label “EDL”) adds further statutory guidance, including with respect to procedure. First, then, the EDL repeats the State’s constitutional requirement of “public use.”143 Next, the EDL
requires that any municipality or other State instrumentality such as a JPA authorized to employ the authority adopt, before doing so, a “resolution of necessity” that
explains the public use for which property is being condemned.144
The resolution for its part is adopted in an open legislative session, after a
public hearing on the question of necessity in which reasons for condemnation are
proffered, debated, and assessed. These familiar legislative procedural requirements
are of course meant to ensure full transparency, reasoned democratic deliberation,
and fair access to all who might wish to take part in those community proceedings in
which municipalities contemplate use of their eminent domain authority.
If and when a resolution of necessity is then adopted, the municipality obtains an appraisal of the condemnable property as described above in Part III, places
the appraised amount in escrow, and files a condemnation action in California Superior Court.145 The Municipal Plan can of course be adapted to incorporate within it
all such procedural steps as might be prescribed by any other participating state’s
and municipality’s eminent domain statutes and ordinances.
But who will these participating states and municipalities be, and why might
they participate? This question takes us straight to our final—Part —which, by describing more fully the imminent consequences of continued delay in implementing
some variant of the Municipal Plan in cities still at the core of our ongoing mortgage
foreclosure crisis, both (1) implicitly identifies municipalities that should find the
Plan most attractive, while (2) rendering clear just how urgent the public purpose
these cities will have for pursuing the Plan will be.

142 See, again, County of Ventura v. Channel Islands Marina, Inc., 159 Cal. App.4th
615, 624 (2008) (apart from the aforementioned protection of residences from Kelo-style taking
with a view to transferring to other private parties, “California courts have construed the
[counterpart federal and state takings provisions] congruently [and] have analyzed takings
claims under decisions of both the California and United States Supreme Courts.”).
143 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010.
144 See id. at § 1245.230. If the State Legislature has provided explicitly by statute that
some particular “use, purpose, object or function” is “one for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised,” then the action is deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature itself
that the use, purpose, object or function in question in indeed a public use. See id. § 1240.010.
145 See id. § 1250.110.
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V. The Plan’s Manifest Public Purpose and Urgent Necessity
We complete this Article by discussing in a bit more detail what is currently
underway in those municipalities located at the center of our ongoing and selfworsening mortgage foreclosure crisis. Specifically, we note the remarkable toll in
family and neighborhood suffering, ongoing and self-worsening value and revenue
loss, and consequent blight that rolling foreclosures are now actively bringing in
their wake.
Closing on this note serves two critical purposes. One is to illustrate how
squarely the public-purpose requirement, under which condemnation proceedings
always proceed, is met by the purposes that prompt the Municipal Plan laid out and
legally analyzed in Parts III and IV. Indeed, we shall see, we have here what amounts
to a textbook case—and then some.
The other purpose we serve is empirically to substantiate, and afford more
appreciation of the true costs occasioned by, that financial and economic dynamic
elaborated over the course of Parts I and II. In effect, then, in this Part we further
support both the legal and financial cases for the Plan, bind all the foregoing Parts
more fully together, and, while at it, flesh out their full human and economic significance on the ground.
The first thing to note on the ground, then, is the great rise in home-vacancy
rates in states hit most hard by the mortgage-foreclosure crisis to date. U.S. Census
Bureau data indicate that the number of non-seasonal vacant properties increased
51% nationally from under 7 million in 2000 to over 10 million in early 2010.146 Ten
states in particular—including California, in keeping with our case study methodology—saw increases of 70% or more.147 Other Sunbelt and “Sand” states—Arizona,
Nevada, and Florida, for example—saw these larger increases as well. The overwhelmingly greater part of the spike in all places, moreover, has occurred since 2006,
when peaked and then plunged.148
Unsurprisingly, high foreclosure rates closely correlate with the growing vacancy rates in question, accounting in many cases for as much as three-fourths of the
increase.149 So too, then, do high underwater mortgage rates, since these themselves
correlate overwhelmingly with foreclosures as noted above in Parts I and II.150 This
is not only because people ultimately leave foreclosed homes. It is also because the
146 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-34, VACANT PROPERTIES: GROWING
NUMBER INCREASES COMMUNITIES’ COSTS AND CHALLENGES (2011) [hereinafter GAO Report],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586089.pdf; see also, FED. RESERVE BD., supra note
8; Dudley, supra note 8; and Alpert, ALPERT ET. AL., supra note 22.
147 GAO Report, supra note 146.
148 Id.
149 Id.; FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 8; ALPERT ET. AL., supra note 22.
150 See supra Parts I and II.
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foreclosure process itself is a drawn-out affair, meaning that foreclosers are unable to
place properties back on the market quickly even where there might be demand.151
As it happens, however, there is little demand either—another source of the spike in
vacancy rates.152 All in all, then, these factors slow the rate at which homes that are
left come to be reoccupied, which of course adds up to spiking vacancy rates.
Associated unemployment, in some cases responsible for foreclosures themselves while in other cases attendant on economic slump that both reinforces and is
reinforced by mass foreclosure, is another source of spiking vacancy rates.153 A tertiary cause appears to be migration from hard hit cities that is itself a response to declining employment opportunities which themselves interact symbiotically with
foreclosure rates per the feedback effects discussed above.154 There are straightforward feedback effects between these phenomena and spiking vacancy rates.155
Growing home vacancy rates of course represent considerable individual
and familial trauma. Involuntarily uprooted families are at least temporarily deprived of the most basic of human needs—the need of shelter, a “home base,” a place
to enjoy stable family life. There are countless studies documenting the incalculable
psychological and physical toll on children, in particular, wrought by foreclosure and
eviction.156 The toll taken on adults is immense as well. As a qualitative matter, this
all perhaps goes without saying. As a quantitative matter, a 70% spike in home vacancy rates is of course much more than a 70% spike in rates of the mentioned traumas. For prior to the spike, what vacancies there are will be less the result of foreclosure than they are or regular economically induced migration.
Growing home vacancy rates also impose great pecuniary and other costs
upon municipalities.157 Although most if not all counties have on their books legal
requirements that owners before and after foreclosure maintain their properties, as a
practical matter this doesn’t tend to happen.158 Parties on either end of foreclosures
have other things on their minds: The foreclosed party, where to go next; the foreclosing party, how in heaven’s name to process all the remaining foreclosures that
impend.
See notes 156 and 157.
GAO Report, supra note 146.
153 GAO Report, supra note 146; FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 8; ALPERT ET. AL., supra
note 22; and supra, Parts I and II.
154 GAO Report, supra note 146.
155 Id.
156 See, e.g., Janet Currie & Erdal Tekin, Is the Foreclosure Crisis Making Us Sick?, NBER
Working Paper No. 17310 (August 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17310; G.T. Kingsley et al., The Impacts of Foreclosures on Families and Communities, White Paper, The Urban Institute, (May, 2009), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf.
157 See GAO Report, supra note 146; FED. RESERVE BD., supra note 8; ALPERT ET. AL., supra note 22; Currie & Tekin, supra note 156; G.T. Kingsley et. al. supra, note 156.
158 GAO Report, supra note 146.
151
152
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The consequence is that municipalities themselves must maintain or demolish the properties in question.159 Simply boarding up abandoned properties typically
costs hundreds to thousands of dollars per structure.160 Cutting grass, draining
swimming pools, or removing debris entails similar costs, some of them repeated
regularly for each property.161 Demolition ultimately proves necessary for many
properties, and entails costs well into the thousands of dollars—even double digit
thousands—for each property demolished.162 Some of these costs are occasioned by
the physical process itself, others by the administrative and judicial requirements
that have to be met before absentee mortgagee-owned property can be simply destroyed.163
Before abandoned properties are properly sealed off or demolished, they also
impose significant safety costs on communities.164 Many of them act as “attractive
nuisances,” to employ the familiar tort law term, to minors and others. Others attract
criminals and crime, including not only drug-dealing and prostitution, but materialsstripping, vandalism and arson.165 These represent not only costs in themselves, but
also costs in the form of increased law enforcement expenditure on the part of affected municipalities.
Abandoned properties also, of course—partly in virtue of the tendencies just
noted but also of themselves—reduce the value of surrounding properties, often thus
leading to further desertion and migration: yet another self-worsening feedback or
“snowball” effect once a critical mass of abandoned properties is reached.166 The
numbers are often impressive. One study has found that even a single foreclosed
home depresses prices of nearby homes from just under one to as high as 8.7 percent.167
Again, this is just one foreclosed home. Another study found that one demolished home reduced the values of 13 surrounding properties by $17,000 per.168 Yet
another study found that a single foreclosed, vacant home reduces the value of
neighboring properties by 10 percent, and all homes within 500 feet of it by an average of .7 percent.169 One could proliferate references to studies of this sort with
abandon,170 but the point is presumably made, and is at all events hardly surprising.
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sources cited supra note 157.
GAO Report, supra note 146.
Sources cited supra note 157.
Sources cited supra note 157.
Sources cited supra note 157.
GAO Report, supra note 146.
Id.
Id.
They are cited with abandon (pun intended) in the GAO Report, supra note 146.
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Also hardly surprising is that all of this foreclosure, abandonment, and consequent value loss results in municipal revenue loss.171 Municipalities in America
overwhelmingly finance their operations through property tax assessments. Lose
property dwellers, lose property values, and you lose funding—all while needing
more such funding to handle the costs wrought by the abandoned homes themselves
as elaborated above. And this is so notwithstanding loan servicers’ being required to
keep up property tax payments during foreclosure proceedings.172
Of course, some federal programs are aimed at assisting hard hit localities in
handling the growing costs despite dwindling revenues.173 But these do not appear to
be functioning well and in any event simply represent shifts of the costs to the federal budget, rather than eliminating the source of those costs. Why on earth would this
be preferred to municipalities’ taking charge of and reversing their own declines on
behalf of their citizens by pursuing the Municipal Plan sketched in Part III?
The costs run through thus far all are attendant on actual foreclosure and actual vacancy. But there are additional costs wrought by what might be called “shadow” vacancy, if one might be forgiven for coining another neologism.174 Here we refer to the much lower investments of moneys and labor in home improvement or
home maintenance that underwater mortgagors make.175
The reasons are not hard to find. For one thing these mortgagors, strapped as
they are, are apt to be out of the house more either working extra hours or seeking
such work. For another thing, insofar as their underwater status induces uncertainty
concerning how much longer they are likely to be able to hold on, it likewise induces
a search for alternative residence and livelihood.
Finally, of course, it would simply not seem to be consistent with “human
nature” to invest one’s care and concern in a home that one senses she might very
soon lose. For all of these reasons, underwater mortgaged homes deteriorate much
more rapidly than do other homes even well before foreclosure. These homes are in a
certain sense “vacant already,” in that the owners in many cases will have psychologically detached themselves from them. Heightened degrees of this same form of detachment of course bring on “walkaway” and “strategic default” in some cases. It is,
after all, financially rational to default on an underwater mortgage, since one thereby

Sources cited supra note 157.
GAO Report, supra note 146.
173 As discussed supra Part II.
174 By analogy to “shadow inventory” and “shadow banking.”
175 See sources cited supra notes 60, 157; see also and Brian T. Meltzer, Mortgage Debt
Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners with Negative Equity (August 2010) (Working Paper, on file with the author).
171
172
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“pays” with the lower-valued asset rather than the higher-valued principal
amount.176
This of course leads straight to the costs that foreclosure and “shadow” foreclosure impose upon lenders themselves. Lenders naturally are well aware of these
costs, and for that very reason are apt to favor principal write-downs. The problem is
that they cannot coordinate to secure them, for reasons comprehensively adduced
above in Part II. Insofar as some of these lenders themselves reside in the municipalities in question, counties that exercise their eminent domain authority pursuant to
the Municipal Plan act authoritatively on their behalves too. And this is of course not
to mention the sense in which these municipalities will act collaterally, in effect, to
the benefit of all others who wish to see principal write-downs as well.
All of the foregoing are widely appreciated, well-documented and wellquantified tendencies nationwide in the midst of our ongoing and self-worsening
mortgage foreclosure crisis. All of them likewise serve to underwrite an obvious and
indeed exigent public purpose on the basis of which municipalities can exercise their
traditional eminent domain authority pursuant to the Plan that is the subject of this
Article. To sharpen things once more with a specific case study, however, it might be
well also to supply some of the applicable numbers for our previously selected illustrative sample state, California, and our sample county therein, San Bernardino.177
Here are a few of the numbers in question.

176 Indeed, “efficient breach” theories of contract reneging such as have proliferated
in conservative, “law and economics” approaches to contract in such schools as the University
of Chicago have it that forgoing strategic default is irrational.
177 For reminder of why San Bernardino, California makes for an illustrative case
study, see supra note 54.
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Conclusion: What’s Next
We have covered a good bit of ground here. But much more remains to be
done. Presumably the financial and legal cases for municipalities’ and cognate authorities’ embracing and acting upon plans like the Municipal Plan have been fully
made. What remains is for specific municipalities now to begin doing so. That is apt
to begin very soon. For there are financial planners and investor coalitions ready to
begin partnering with the hardest hit counties. Once these counties and their private
partners commence proceedings, and once they start succeeding, and once word gets
out, others will surely be quick to follow. For it is the solution that all of them have
quite literally been waiting for.
In closing, perhaps the following observation will be in order. “We” might
not have turned out to be “the ones we’ve been waiting for” if the “we” in question is
our presently “operationally challenged” federal government. But “we” indeed are
the ones we’ve been waiting for if “we” be our own towns and neighborhoods—if
“we” be “the people” in that much more concrete and visceral, rather than diffuse
and abstract, sense that a great observer of American life once suggested. The observer in question was Alexis de Tocqueville, who said, in effect—well before a quotable former First Lady did—that in America, it takes a village. It would seem he was
right.

